Handbook  to  the 

"Wksliingtoii 


ther 


rn.  ^;ru:>"*' 


pctve7'^  ^^n- 


the 


etc 


nle7 


0 


H^ 


dson 


li 


le 


i'"^:^^^'"r'cM 


1  »"2:>''!?0"' 


er 


crtce 


b^ 


ast^^;,W«^ 


frfli*' 


lu 


i)V 


•ston 


^^'.t,.!*^''* 


Bo« 


acke» 


to 


the 


fev^Siiliillli 


Hi  II 


Bl!((i  f'ljii 


> 


|^^i?^*T*^\'.  i'^"*'^ 


ROADS  TO  PEACE 

t 

1 1 

A  Hand 'hook  to  the 
IVashington  Conference 

CONTENTS 

The  Meaning  of  the  Conference  Herbert  Croly 
^public  Opinion  in  Japan  .  .  .  yohn  Dewey 
frhe  British  View  ....  George  Glasgow 
What  France  Wants  .  .  .  Sis  ley  Huddleston 
A  Japanese  Rebuttal  ....  Bruce  B liven 
Private  Enterprise  and  Pubb'c  War  M.  0,  Hudson 
A  Baedeker  to  the  Conference  Frank  y,  Taylor 
Sea  Power  in  the  Pacific     .      .      .     Stark  Young 


'SMaSSEsLffSr 


New  Republic  Pamphlet  No.  2 

Published  by  the 
REPUBLIC      PUBLISHING      CO.,      INC 

421   West  Twenty-first  Street 

New  York  City 

1921 


JTtC  /  ^  -7  c^ 


V' 


Copyright   192 1 
Republic  Publishing  Co.  Inc. 


Roads  to  Peace 

A  Hand-book  to  the  Washington  Conference 


What  the  Conference  Means 

hy  Herbert  Croly 

I,      Tllli;  INTEREST  OE  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  LAND  ARMAMENTS 

THE  most  fundamental  business  with  which  the  Washington  Con- 
ference will  deal  is  the  sickness  of  Europe  and  the  route  to  recov-  /^^ 
ery.  The  President  and  J\lr.  Hughes  for  reasons  to  which  I  will  ~- 
refer  later  shy  away  from  this  matter,  but  they  cannot  prevent  its  consid- 
eration and  they  have  not  dared  to  try.  Indeed,  by  including  land  disarma- 
ment in  the  agenda,  they  invited  the  European  delegates  to  propose  for 
discussion  both  the  poUtical  dissensions  and  the  economic  disabilities  of 
Europe.  The  European  governments  know  perfectly  well  that  their 
expenditures  on  armaments  are  one  of  the  chief  barriers  to.  economic 
recovery,  but  these  expenditures  are  only  the  doctor's  bills  which  their 
political  maladies  force  them  to  pay.  They  will  propose,  consequently, 
to  discuss  the  limitation  of  land  armaments  in  relation  to  the  national 
conflicts  of  which  these  armies  are  the  instruments,  and  as  this  proposal 
will  only  repeat  the  proposal  of  the  United  States  in  relation  to  the 
discussion  of  naval  armaments,  the  American  delegation  cannot  refuse. 
Yet  the  inability  to  refuse  will  place  the  American  government  in  an 
awkward  position.  For  the  British  and  French  delegations  will,  in  for- 
mulating their  attitude  towards  European  armament  and  its  economic 
effect,  focus  the  discussion  upon  an  embarrassing  aspect  of  the  subject. 
They  will  insist  upon  the  impossibility  of  recovery  without  positive  as- 
sistance from  abroad,  which  the  United  States  is  alone  in  a  position  to 
supply;  and  they  will  ask  the  United  States  to  toe  the  mark.  This  the 
American  government  is  extremely  reluctant  to  do.  No  matter  how 
courteously  it  refuses,  the  refusal  will  look  churlish  and  selfish.  What 
is  the  justification  for  the  refusal?  And  what  will  be  its  effect  upon 
the  outcome  of  the  Conference? 

The   French    argument    and    policy   is    ingeniously    and    persuasively 
stated  by   Mr.   Sisley   Huddleston   elsewhere   in   this   pamphlet.     It   is 

[3] 

478419 


in  substance  a' feiwsai  to •  dx\3Ctrm  until  France  can  count  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  her  bill  for  reparations  and  upon  absolute  future  security.  She 
will  ask  substantially  as  a  price  of  disarmament  that  the  American  gov- 
ernment guarantee  the  payment  of  the  reparations  account  and  enter 
into  a  defensive  alliance  with  her  against  Germany.  She  does  not  ask 
for  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  but  she  does  ask  for  the 
ratification  of  the  Anglo-French-American  agreement  to  protect  the 
French  frontier  against  another  German  attack.  She  cannot  consider 
any  reduction  of  military  expenses  and  land  armaments  unless  an  Ameri- 
can army  remains  actually  or  potentially  upon  the  Rhine. 

An  American  government  controlled  by  the  Republican  party  cannot 
acquiesce  in  this  argument  without  repudiating  its  declared  policy  with 
respect  to  European  entanglements.  It  rejected  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  chiefly  because  of  Article  X  and  the  consequent  implication  of 
the  American  nation  in  European  territorial  disputes.  The  proposed 
Anglo-French-American  convention  would,  far  more  than  the  Covenant, 
constitute  a  guarantee  by  this  country  of  the  territorial  disposition's  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  For  France  will  construe  any  attempt  by 
Germany  to  escape  from  the  Treaty  as  an  attack,  and  as  Germany  re- 
covers, if  she  is  allowed  to  recover,  she  will  become  increasingly  re- 
bellious against  tbe  legislation  of  Versailles.  In  that  event  the  Ameri- 
can nation  would  have  assumed  an  onerous  military  responsibility — one 
which  it  could  not  perm.anently  redeem  unless  it  added  svibstantially  to  the 
number  of  its  trained  soldiers  and  to  its  whole  military  equipment. 

The  disinclination  by  the  Republicans  to  ratify  the  Aliglo-French- 
American  convention  is  dictated  chiefly  by  a  desire  to  keep  the  Almerican 
nation  out  of  war,  but  in  spite  of  its  screen  of  self-'preoccupation  it 
makes  for  a  result  which  is  as  much  to  the  advantage  of  Europe  as  to  the 
advantage  of  this  country.  An  American  guarantee  to  France  against 
attack  by  Germany  would  not  bring  appeasement  to  Europe  and  it  would 
not  result,  except  perhaps  for  a  moment,  in  the  reduction  of  European 
military  expenses  and  land  armament.  It  would  perpetuate  the  European 
civil  war  by  giving  renewed  vitality  to  its  major  causes.  Reassured  by 
the  American  guarantee,  France  would  not  feel  the  need  of  accommodat- 
ing her  policy  to  the  susce'ptibilities  and  the  interests  of  Germany  and 
Russia.  Her  convention  with  America  would  mean  to  her  the  confirma- 
tion of  military  victory,  obtained  as  the  result  of  American  intervention, 
and  a  relief  from  the  necessity,  which  she  is  now  increasingly  feeling, 
of  seeking  security  b'y  means  of  an  agreement  with  Germany. 

The  American  nation  cannot  guarantee  security  to  a  France  whose 
insecurity  is  rooted  deep  in  European  dis'sensions.  It  cannot  pledge 
its  military  power  to  safeguard  France  against  the  consequences  of  a 

[4] 


foreign  policy  over  which  it  exercises  no  control.  The  European  nations, 
if  they  wish  for  security  and  recuperation,  must  first  deal  remedially 
with  the  causes  of  their  own  dissensions  and  move  in  the  direction  of 
a  political  reconciliation  with  one  another.  French  opinion,  faced  with 
the  impossibihty  of  collecting  reparations  from  Germany  and  the  necessity 
of  choosing  hetween  a  policy  of  accepting  this  fact  or  using  it  to  destroy 
Germany,  is  hesitating.  If  France  decides  to  carry  on  the  destructiSVi 
of  Germany,  she  will  almost  certainly  isolate  herself  and  bring  wh/t 
remains  of  Germany  nearer  to  Great  Britain,  America  and  Russi^/^  It 
is  a  very  dangerous  course  which  she  may  well  shrink  from  adopting. 
But  what  is  the  alternative?  If  she  does  not  wish  or  dare  to  destroy 
Germany  and  yet  is  not  protected  against  ultimate  German  resentment, 
i's  she  not  bound  in  the  long  run  to  seek  an  accommodation?  Will  not 
the  logical  and  realistic  French  mind  understand  the  force  of  this  alter- 
native and  act  on  the  understanding?  Would  not  a  defensive  alHance 
with  this  country  cloud  the  issues  and  tempt  her  to  pursue  a  temporizing 
policy  of  preventing  the  recuperation  of  Germany  regardless  of  its  effect 
upon  Europe  and  the  world? 

When  the  American  friends  of  France  and  Europe  urge  an  immediate 
political  intervention  in  Europe  by  the  American  government,  they  are 
performing  a  poor  service  for  the  object  of  their  solicitude.  What  they 
are  really  proposing  is  an  assuimption  by  the  United  States  of  a  re- 
sponsibility for  European  welfare  and  a  leadership  in  European  affairs, 
which,  if  it  were  successful,  would  be  tantamount  not  only  to  the  ab- 
dication of  Europe  as  the  king  of  continents,  but  to  its  supersession  by 
the  chief  American  nation.  No  doubt  if  the  American  people  divined 
the  opportunity  of  dominating  the  civilized  world  for  a  few  generations 
which  now  lies  within  their  grasp  and  if  they  were  ready  to  subordinate 
the  use  of  their  economic  and  military  resources  to  that  end,  they  might 
by  a  colossal  tour  de  force  impose  a  temporary  equilibrium  on  Europe 
and  pose  as  its  paternal  rescuer.  But  the  American  people  are  not 
capable  of  such  an  effort  of  the  imagination  and  the  will,  and  if  they 
were,  they  would  commit  themselves  to  an  adventure  ultimately  dis- 
astrous to  themselves  and  to  Europe.  Before  it  can  accept  American 
aid  with  safety  or  profit,  Europe  must  mitigate  its  domestic  animosities 
and  dissensions.  European  recovery  is  primarily  a  European  problem. 
It  will  take  a  European  conference,  in  which  Gprjnany  and  Russia 
represented  as  equals,  to  engineer  the  work.  The  only  way  in  which  the 
European  peoples  can  regain  anything  like  their  former  power  and 
prestige  is  to  forget  about  France  d'abord  and  Deutschland  iiber  Alles 
and  become  first  of  all  good  Europeans.  When  they  have  become  better 
Europeans,  they  can  ask  Americans  to  become  better  citizens  of  the  world. 

[5] 


Two  years  ago  the  advice  to  the  European  nations  to  earn  assistance 
by  becoming  first  of  all  good  Europeans  would  heve  seemed  like  a  fan- 
tastic impossibility.  It  does  not  look  very  practicable  today,  but  it  is 
not  as  fantastic  as  it  formerly  was.  P'ellowship  in  adversity  has 
diminished  some  of  the  animosities,  egotisms  and  conflicts  which  Europe 
inherited  from  the  war;  and  adversity  will,  I  am  afraid,  continue  until 
the  Europeans  renew  and  increase  their  conviction  of  common  interests 
and  destinies.  The  American  nation  can  and  will  alleviate  the  resultant 
suffering,  as  it  did  last  year  in  Central  Europe  and  as  it  is  now  doing 
in  Russia.  But  it  cannot  take  over  responsibility  for  the  condition 'or  for 
the  cure.  If  France  will  not  reduce  armaments  without  the  presence, 
actual  or  potential,  of  American  troops  on  her  eastern  frontier,  then 
France  will  have  to  remain  armed  and  both  France  and  Europe  will  have 
to  pay  the  bill.  The  French  are  not  the  only  people  in  the  world  who  are 
entitled  to  security.  They  will  never  get  it  for  themselves  until  they  are 
willing  to  share  it  with  others. 

As  long  as  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  the  foundation  of  European 
public  law  and  the  French  attitude  remains  what  it  is.  there  is  little  or 
no  chance  of  land  disarmament.  Neither  can  the  American  government 
take  the  lead  in  bringing  it  about.  The  American  army  is  already  re- 
duced to  the  volume  of  a  police  force ;  and  the  French  proposal,  what- 
ever its  temporary  effects  on  European  military  expenditures,  would 
increase  the  military  responsibility  of  this  country.  The  European 
nations  have  no  sufficient  excuse  for  passing  the  problem  of  diminishing 
land  armaments  on  to  the  American  people,  x^merica  may  eventually 
help  in  reducing  them  to  manageable  limits,  but  only  in  case  the  Euro- 
pean nations  will  themselves  move  towards  the  conversion  of  Europe 
from  a  bigger  Balkans  into  a  greater  Switzerland. 

In  so  far  as  the  United  States  can  help  the  European  peoples  in  re- 
ducing their  land  armajnents  to  manageable  limits,  it  should  use  for  that 
purpose  an   economic  rather  than   a   political  leverage.     The  case  for 
American  economic  assistance  to  Europe  is  much  stronger  than  the  case 
pTor  political  and  military  assistance.     An  enormous  proportion  of  the 
1  iin^iiediately   available    financial   and   economic   power   of    the    world   is 
c/ncentrated   in   the   United   States.     The  proportion   is  so   large  that 
European  recovery  will  be  unnecessarily  and  deplorabl}'-  delayed  uuless 
it  can  obtain  American  cooperation.     Indeed  it  is  no  exaggeration  to 
^♦eay  that  without  active  American  aid  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  Euro- 
pean nations  to  balance  their  budgets,  stabilize  their  currencies  and  re- 
store their  credits.    Of  course  the  United  States  cannot  by  any  display  of 
generosity   bestow   solvency   upon   economically   bankrupt   governments 
any  more  than  it  can  bestow  security  upon  nations  whose  political  lia'bili- 

[6] 


ties  far  exceed  their  political  assets.  But  it  can,  should,  and  in  the  end 
nmst  help  Europe  to  write  off  financial  liabilities  which,  if  written  off, 
would  enormously  alleviate  the  existing  political  exasperation,  and  in  the 
end  the  military  expenditures.  France  and  Great  Britain  would  willingly 
scale  down  the  German  reparation  account  whose  size  is  a  source  of 
so  much  of  that  existing  political  instability,  provided  the  American  gov- 
ernment would  not  insist  on  collecting  the  debts  due  to  this  country. 

The  American  government  is  as  little  prepared  just  at  present  to  cancel 
any  considerable  part  of  its  loans  to  Europe  as  it  is  to  guarantee  the 
Rhine  frontier,  but  we  trust  that  in  this  second  respeot  the  Conference 
will  have  an  educational  effect  both  upon  Congress  and  the  administra- 
tion. The  delegates  from  the  major  European  countries  will  have  excel- 
lent reasons  and^  opportunities  to  call  the  attention  of  the  American 
delegation  and  American  public  opinion  to  the  partial  dependence  of  their 
political  and  military  upon  their  economic  liabilities,  and  the  demonstra- 
tion, if  submitted  with  tact  will  little  by  little  dissolve  the  existing  ob- 
stacles to  the  acceptance  of  the  truth  and  will  soak  in. 

Will  the  assumption  by  the  American  government  of  the  attitude  to- 
wards European  problems  which  I  have  indicated  wreck  the  Conference? 
Will  the  refusal  to  guarantee  Europe  against  the  consequences  of  its 
dissensions  result  in  a  refusal  by  the  European  governments  to  consider 
on  their  merits  the  American  proposals  to  limit  naval  armaments  and  to 
remove  the  causes  of  disorder  in  the  Pacific?  It  may  have  this  result. 
There  is  a  disposition  among  European  diplomats  to  consider  national 
politics  as  necessarily  the  trading  of  exclusive  advantages,  and  if  this 
disposition  prevails  in  Washington,  and  if  the  Aanerican  government  will 
not  consider  the  European  claim  for  economic  assistance,  the  Conference 
may  increase  instead  of  diminishing  international  disorder.  But  there 
is  a  good  chance  that  it  will  not.  The  American  government  may  prove 
to  be  open  to  conviction  about  its  share  in  the  economic  disabilities  of 
Europe.  For  its  own  part  it  is  not  asking  Europe  to  accept  and  approve 
an  egotistic  national  American  policy  in  the  Pacific,  but  to  help  in 
defending  and  eradicating  the  existing  causes  of  disorder  and  the  excuses 
for  naval  armaments.  The  European  governments  can  lend  a  hand  with- 
out assuming  American  or  Asiatic  liabilities  or  imperilling  any  assets 
which  belong  properly  to  themselves.  If  they  are  candidly  and  wisely 
approached,  they  will,  considering  the  predicament  of  the  world  and  the 
pressure  by  public  opinion  for  concrete  results,  be  likely  to  consent. 

2.      THE    INTEREST   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   IN    NAVAL  ARMAMENTS 

The  United  States  cannot  at  present  take  the  initiative  in  bringing 
about  tb.e  reduction  of  armies,  the  cost  of  which  is  ruining  Europe.     Its 

[7] 


inability  to  deal  with  the  causes  of  the  disorder  and  dissension  in  Europe, 
the  expression  of  which  is  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  prevents  it  from 
deahng  with  their  effects  in  insecurity  and  armaments.  But  it  occupies 
an  entirely  different  position  with  respect  to  the  reduction  of  navies.  It 
is  qualified  in  all  probability  to  bring  about  a  limitation  of  naval  arma- 
ment and  to  give  permanence  to  a  holiday  in  the  building  of  battleships 
by  removing  the  reasons  which  have  prompted  its  own  and  other  govern- 
ments to  compete  for  the  control  of  the  seas.  Naval  armament  is  a 
matter  in  which  America  is  unavoidably  and  overwihelmingly  interested. 

We  have  emerged  from  the  war  with  a  navy  which  will  soon  be  on 
paper  either  a  little  inferior  or  a  little  superior  to  that  of  Great  Britain. 
The  United  States  is  one  of  the  three  great  naval  powers  in  the  world, 
and  if  it  decided  to  become  the  first,  it  could  afford  to  outbuild  both 
Japan  and  Great  Britain.  It  is  one  of  the  ironies  of  history  that  the 
actual  outcome  of  the  competition  in  naval  armaments  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  is  the  construction  of  a  fleet  by  the  United  States 
which  forms  a  more  'serious  threat  to  British  naval  supremacy  than  the 
German  or  any  other  fleet  has  been  since  Napoleonic  wars;  but  in  this 
as  in  many  other  respects  the  war  only  precipitated  a  result  which  was 
likely  some  time  to  take  place.  The  American  nation  is  the  creature  of 
maritime  exploration  and  traffic.  During  the  pioneer  period  when  we 
were  conquering  the  continent,  our  eyes  were  fastened  on  the  land,  but 
sea  power,  its  distribution  and  deportment,  must  always  remain  one  of 
our  chief  objects  of  national  and  international  solicitude.  We  have  al- 
ready fought  a  war  with  Great  Britain  over  what  we  took  to  be  her  bad 
maritime  manners.  We  entered  the  late  war  as  the  result  of  a  quarrel 
with  Germany  about  a  violation  of  the  rules  of  the  sea.  We  are  not 
as  yet  dependent  on  the  sea  for  subsistence,  as  are  the  British  Isles,  but 
it  is  only  a  question  of  time.  A  hundred  million  people  with  thousands 
of  miles  of  coast  line  on  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  and  with  the 
welfare  of  its  people  increasingly  derived  from  foreign  commerce  is, 
in  a  disorderly  world,  bound  to  need  and  demand  a  navy  big  enough  to 
challenge  the  control  of  the  seas. 

The  American  fleet  was  not  built  for  the  purpose  of  disputing  the 
control  of  the  seas  with  the  British  fleet.  It  was  built  as  the  result  of 
a  vague  but  intense  feeling  that  the  world  was  becoming  an  increasingly 
dangerous  place,  in  which  nations  must  arm  for  their  own  defence.  Was 
there  any  justification  for  this  apprehension?  Not  so  far  as  Great  Britain 
is  concerned.  American  public  opinion  is  not  in  my  opinion  any  more 
apprehensive  of  danger  from  the  British  Empire  than  Canada  is  of  an 
attack  from  the  United  States.  If  the  American  and  British  fleets  were 
the  only  powerful  navies  now  in  existence,  the  two  governments  could 

[8] 


negotiate  to  reduce  their  size  without  raising  any  outstanding  or  serious 
difference  of  poHtical  policy.  But  there  is  another  powerful  fleet  in 
existence — that  of  Japan;  and  about  the  Japanese  fleet  Aimerican  public 
opinion  takes  a  different  attitude.  If  the  world  is  a  dangerous  place 
in  the  eyes  of  an  American,  it  is  chiefly  because  of  the  Japanese  navy 
and  army.  He  would  not  hesitate  to  approve  any  expenditure  which  his 
government  might  consider  necessary  to  provide  for  naval  protection 
against  Japan.  In  his  mind  the  American  fleet  has  of  recent  years  come 
to  exist  chiefly  for  that  purpose. 

The  situation  with  respect  to  naval  armaments  is,  consequently,  some- 
thing like  this.  There  are  three  formidable  fleets  in  existence — those  of 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States  and  Japan.  In  spite  of  the  existence 
of  some  friction  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  neither 
at  present  is  afraid  of  the  other's  navy  as  a  threat  to  its  own  safety. 
The  statement  is  even  more  true  of  the  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
British  Empire.  They  are  in  fact  allies  for  certain  definite  purposes. 
But  the  United  States  is  afraid  of  Japan,  and  Japan  is  even  more  afraid 
of  the  United  States.  Why  cannot  the  two  governments  quiet  these  fears 
by  reaching  a  joint  agreement  to  cut  down  their  fleets  by  a  third  or  a 
half  or  even  two-thirds?  And  why  can  they  not  reach  such  an  agreement 
without  raising  any  differences  of  political  policy? 

3.      WHY  BRING   IN   THE   FAR   KAST  ? 

They  could,  were  it  not  for  a  fact  of  major  importance.  Japan  is, 
of  course,  exclusively  a  Pacific  power.  The  United  States  possesses 
long  coast  Hnes  on  both  the  Pacific  and  the  Atlantic.  The  American 
people  have  had  no  reason  to  fear  the  British  fleet,  because  unlike  the 
German  fleet  it  was  not  associated  with  a  dangerously  large  army  and 
because  Great  Britain  tacitly  approved  of  the  IMonroe  Doctrine  which 
protected  the  Americans  against  the  aggressive  designs  of  European 
powers.  But  it  is  different  in  the  Pacific.  That  part  of  Asia  which  is 
washed  by  the  waters  of  the  Pacific  has  endured  fifty  years  of  systematic 
foreign  exploitation  in  which  all  the  large  European  powers,  except  Italy, 
participated.  Something  over  twenty  years  ago  the  American  govern- 
ment started  to  protect  China,  and  since  then  and  particularly  since  the 
victory  of  Japan  over  Russia,  the  European  nations  abandoned  the 
political  penetration  of  China  and  confined  themselves  to  economic 
penetration.  Thereafter  the  only  power  which  continued  a  policy  of 
poHtical  aggression  on  the  Asiatic  mainland  was  Japan.  In  1910  the 
American  government  proposed  the  neutralization  of  the  Manchurian 
Railways  for  the  purpose  of  freeing  China  from  the  worst  threat  to  its 
independence  and  giving  reality  to  the  policy  of  equal  economic  rights 

[9] 


for  all  nations  in  China,  but  Japan  would  not  consider  the  proposal  and 
allied  herself  with  Russia  in  opposition  to  American  interference.  Later 
she  used  the  occasion  of  the  war  to  impose  the  Twenty-one  Demands  on 
China,  to  seize  Shantung  and  to  occupy  part  of  Siberia. 

The  Japanese  navy  is,  consequently,  the  instrument  of  a  policy  of  ag- 
gression, which  looks  in  the  direction  of  giving  Japan  political  suzerainty 
over  eastern  Asia.  The  United  States  has  reason  to  fear  and  resist  this 
policy  to  an  extent  to  which  she  has  no  reason  to  fear  and  resist  the  im- 
perialism of  the  European  powers  in  Africa  or  in  western  Asia.  She  has 
historic  interests  and  rights  in  China  which  Japanese  aggression  endan- 
gers, but  that  is  not  all.  If  during  the  next  few  generations  Japan  con- 
tinues to  expand  along  the  lines  on  which  she  has  expanded  during  the  last 
generation,  she  will  become  a  danger  to  all  free  nations  with  a  coast  line 
on  the  Pacific.  She  will  become  a  nation  with  engineers,  capitalists,  sailors 
and  soldiers  at  its  head,  who  have  occupied  territories  on  the  mainland 
in  order  to  obtain  access  to  raw  materials  and  an  abundance  of  cheap 
labor,  and  who  will  seek  to  keep  for  their  own  benefit  both  these  natural 
resources  and  the  vast  undeveloped  market  of  the  Chinese  people.  This 
Japanese  Empire  will  need  for  its  security  a  conscript  army  and  a  fleet 
strong  enough  to  control  the  waters  of  the  Pacific — a  fleet  which  in  the 
end  will  be  commensurate  with  the  size  of  this  huge  enterprise  in  political 
and  economic  imperialism.  Such  a  fleet  controlled  by  the  same  govern- 
ment which  commanded  the  second  largest  army  in  the  world  and  de- 
signed to  safeguard  a  policy  which  deprives  between  three  and  four 
hundred  million  people  of  political  independence,  is  a  menace  to  human 
liberty  which  it  would  he  foolhardy  to  ignore. 

Let  us  suppose  the  American  government  agrees  with  the  British  and 
Jaj^anese  governments  to  reduce  their  fleets  to  one-third  of  the  size 
which  they  will  have  reached  in  1924,  but  ignores  the  differences  of 
political  and  economic  policy  between  Japan  and  the  LTnited  States, 
what  would  be  the  result?  Japan  would  still  possess  a  fleet  large 
enough  to  protect  her  water  communications  with  the  mainland  and  the 
transmission  of  soldiers  and  commodities  which  the  carrying  on  of  her 
continental  Asiatic  policy  demands.  She  could  continue  her  policy  of 
economic  and  political  domination  in  China  without  any  fear  of  hindrance 
and  could  snap  her  fingers,  as  she  did  in  1910,  at  the  protests  of  the 
United  States.  Assuming  the  success  of  her  attempts  to  industrialize 
China,  she  would  accumulate  resources  in  capital,  industrial  ecpiipment 
and  technical  skill,  which  would  enable  her,  if  necessary  and  when  the 
time  came,  to  defend  her  economic  conquests  with  a  fleet  much  more 
powerful  than  that  which  she  can  now  afford.  A  limitation  of  naval 
armament,  that  is,  without  any  attempt  to  do  away  with  the  economic 

[10] 


and  political  aggression  which  renders  Japan  dangerous  immediately  to 
China  and  ultimately  to  the  United  States,  would  not  do  anything  per- 
manently to  diminish  the  chances  of  war  or  the  expenses  of  armament. 

The  limitation  of  armaments  as  a  physical  fact  is  important,  hut  it  is 
not  decisive  as  an  agency  of  peace.  National  armament  is  the  creature 
of  national  policy.  If  a  nation  cherishes  policies  which  impair  the  free- 
dom and  prevent  the  development  of  other  nations,  it  is  hound  to  arm 
in  self-protection  against  the  resentment  and  the  fear  of  other  nations. 
It  may  agree  temporarily  to  limit  its  armaments  provided  those  who 
suffer  from  its  aggression  or  are  opposed  to  its  pretensions  agree  to  a 
similar  limitation.  But  in  that  event  disarmament  is  an  advantage  to 
the  aggressor.  It  frees  his  hand.  The  helplessness  of  China  has  pro- 
vided her  aggressors  with  their  opportunity.  In  the  end  she  will  as- 
sume the  job  of  protecting  herself,  but  in  the  meantime  those  who 
understand  the  disastrous  consequence  of  an  indefinite  continuation  of 
the  exploitation  of  the  past  must  try  to  provide  for  her  protection.  If 
they  disarm  without  raising  any  question  about  the  results  of  their  dis- 
armament on  the  political  and  economic  conditions  of  the  Far  East, 
they  may  be  as  powerless  to  protect  China  as  China  is  to  protect  herself. 

The  British  Empire  with  its  fleet  occupies  an  extremely  significant 
and  important  relationship  to  the  strategic  strength  of  Japanese  political 
aggression  on  the  Asiatic  mainland.  Some  twenty  years  ago  it  entered 
into  an  aUiance  with  Japan  whereby  Japan,  in  exchange  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Great  Britain  against  an  attack  by  combination  of  European 
powers,  guaranteed  British  possessions  in  the  Far  East.  The  bargain 
promised  to  be  of  enormous  benefit  to  both  countries.  It  promoted 
Japan  from  the  position  of  a  suspected  inferior  who  was  never  invited 
to  dine  with  the  diplomatic  swells  into  a  regular  member  of  international 
good  society  who  could  not  be  ignored  without  giving  offence  to  the 
Dowager  Empress  of  the  High  Seas.  It  protected  her  in  the  event  of 
war  with  another  power  from  what  had  happened  to  her  after  her  vic- 
tory over  China.  On  the  other  hand,  it  enabled  the  British  Empire  to 
reduce  its  fleet  in  the  Far  Eastern  waters  without  compromising  the 
safety  of  its  Asiatic  colonies;  and  this  was  a  most  important  consider- 
ation to  a  power  which  was,  as  a  result  of  the  expense  of  maintaining 
its  supremacy  in  Eurpean  waters,  already  feeling  the  need  of  naval 
concentration  in  the  North  Sea.  It  proved  to  be  even  more  serviceable 
than  it  promised.  It  protected  Japan  during  and  after  her  war  with 
Russia  from  European  interference,  while  it  enabled  Great  Britain,  when 
the  German  fleet  became  a  grave  source  of  danger  and  the  need  of  con- 
centration paramount,  to  withdraw  all  capital  ships  from  the  Far  East. 

But  its  very  success  has  involved  undesirable  and  unexpected  conse- 

[II] 


qiiences.  Its  declared  object  with  respect  to  the  Far  East  was  to  ensure 
stabiHty  and  to  guarantee  the  open  door  into  China  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  that  country.  Its  result  has  been  to  assist  Japan  in  dis- 
turbing the  stabihty  of  the  Far  Fast  and  to  prevent  China  or  the  United 
States  from  daring  to  set  up  an  effective  resistance.  During  the  twenty 
years  of  the  alliance's  existence  Japan  has  come  to  be  the  greatest  single 
danger  to  Chinese  political  independence  and  the  actual  equality  of 
economic  opportunity  in  China.  The  British  Fmpire  is  chargeable  with 
a  clear  responsibility  for  this  result.  It  has  gradually  withdrawn  its 
capital  ships  from  the  Far  East,  and  by  virtue  of  the  alliance,  it  has 
conferred  on  the  Japanese  fleet  in  the  Far  Eastern  waters  the  function 
of  maritime  police  which  its  own  fleet  has  filled  in  the  Atlantic.  But 
in  the  Far  East  the  police  has  also  played  the  part  of  the  aggressor. 
Japan  has  adopted  a  poHcy  of  continental  conquest  and  expansion  which 
depended  for  her  security  and  continued  prosperity  upon  the  control  of 
the  seas.  Her  ally,  the  boasted  Mistress  of  the  Seas,  is  necessarily  the 
accomplice  of  this  policy.  In  1910  the  American  government  tried  by  pro- 
posing the  neutralization  of  the  Manchurian  Railways  to  protect  China 
and  to  check  Japan.  It  depended  for  the  success  of  its  diplomatic  en- 
terprise on  British  cooperation.  But  that  cooperation  was  not  forth- 
coming. In  spite  of  the  declared  sympathy  of  the  British  Foreign  Office 
with  the  political  and  economic  objects  of  the  American  proposal,  it  was 
obliged  when  the  conflict  came,  to  favor  its  ally  and  to  consent  to  the 
defeat  of  the  intrinsically  sound  American  proposal. 

Thus  Great  Britain  looms  as  large  as  either  Japan  or  the  United 
States  in  relation  to  the  discussion  of  the  disorder  in  the  Far  East  and 
the  bearing  of  the  disorder  on  naval  armaments  and  disarmament.  The 
British  Commonwealth  is  as  much  interested  in  the  pacification  of  the 
Pacific  as  it  is  in  the  pacification  of  the  Atlantic.  It  is  interested  not 
only  because  of  its  possessions  and  concessions  in  China  and  because 
of  its  alliance  with  Japan,  but  because  three  of  its  self-governing  do- 
minions expose  long  coast  lines  to  the  waters  of  the  Pacific  and  have 
as  much  reason  as  the  United  States  to  dread  the  unchecked  growth  of 
Japanese  military,  naval,  economic  and  political  imperialism. 

Perhaps  the  reader  will  now  understand  why  the  American  govern- 
ment associated  a  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  with  a 
consideration  of  the  political  and  economic  problems  of  the  Far  East. 
It  hopes  by  means  of  this  association  to  remove  the  causes  of  suspicion 
and  misunderstanding  among  the  three  great  naval  powers.  If  it  suc- 
ceeds they  will  agree  to  limit  naval  armaments  not  merely  because  their 
fleets  cost  too  much  or  because  armaments  are  a  danger  to  "civilization," 
b'ut  ibecause  they  have  nothing  to  gain  by  maintaining  them  and  nothing 

[12] 


to  lose  by  giving  them  up.  It  may  not  succeed,  but  it  is  adopting  the 
most  promising  way  of  associating  the  reduction  in  naval  expenditures 
with  the  prevalence  in  one  part  of  the  world  of  socialized  standards  of 
international  conduct.  It  seeks  to  convert  disarmament  from  a  tem- 
porary expedient  to  rescue  "civilization"  by  saving  money,  into  a  more 
enduring  source  of  international  security  and  peace.  In  so  far  as  it  suc- 
ceeds it  will  set  up  in  one  of  the  major  territories  and  oceans  of  the  world 
an  understanding  which  may  develop  into  a  permanently  sound  working 
relationship.  It  will  begin  to  do  for  a  particular  neighborhood  the  work 
which  the  League  of  Nations  was  supposed  to  do  for  the  whole  world. 
Its  authors  hope  by  limiting  the  area  of  the  liability  and  the  size  of  the 
problem  to  accomplish  a  more  satisfactory  job. 

The  advisor  of  President  Harding  who  proposed  and  carried  out  the 
idea  possessed  the  vision  of  a  statesman.  He  was  reviving  the  best  ar- 
ticle in  the  traditional  American  diplomatic  creed.  It  was  the  article 
which  John  Hay  first  defined  when  he  asked  the  European  powers  to 
accept  the  open  door  as  the  foundation  of  their  relations  with  China ; 
the  article  which  Philander  Knox  amplified  when  he  proposed  the  neu- 
tralization of  the  Manchurian  Railways,  and  the  article  which  Woodrow 
Wilson  repudiated  when  he  consented  to  the  cession  of  Shantung  to 
Japan.  An  international  agreement  which  initiated  a  promising  settle- 
ment of  the  problem  of  China  would  accomplish  as  much  for  the  future 
peace  of  the  world  as  would  a  healing  of  the  quarrel  between  France 
and  Germany.  It  would  enormously  increase  the  feeling  of  general 
security  and  the  confidence  in  the  method  of  conference  and  consent,  as 
opposed  to  the  method  of  force,  in  the  adjustment  of  international  dif- 
ferences. It  would  disarm  the  three  great  naval  powers  not  merely  in 
the  flesh  but  in  the  spirit.  It  would  not  only  do  something  to  save 
western  civilization  but  it  would  make  it  better  worth  saving. 

4.      THE   TEST   OF   AMERICAN   GOOD   FAITH 

It  will  not  be  easy  for  the  American  government  to  succeed.  The  ob- 
stacles are  prodigious.  The  pitfalls  are  many,  dangerous  and  carefully 
camoufilaged.  The  keen  desire  for  success  may  prove  to  be  the  worst 
pitfall  of  all.  It  may  persuade  the  American  delegation  to  sacrifice 
more  obscure  but  fundamental  and  enduring  benefits  for  a  tangible  and 
definite  but  superficial  achievement.  When  the  Conference  comes  to  an 
end,  it  may  be  difficult  to  decide  how  far  it  has  succeeded.  After  the 
Paris  Conference  equally  competent  people  declared  Mr.  Wilson's  work 
to  be  both  a  brilliant  success  and  a  flagrant  failure.  Mr.  Hughes'  man- 
agement of  the  Washington  Conference  may  provoke  equally  sharp  dif- 
ferences of  opinion. 

[13] 


Mr.  Hughes'  best  chance  of  success  depends  upon  the  adoption  b'y 
the  American  delegation  of  a  vigorous  initiative  with  respect  both  to 
the  limitation  of  naval  armaments  and  an  understanding  about  the 
political  and  economic  future  of  the  Far  East.  There  will  exist  in  the 
minds  of  the  foreign  delegates  and  particularly  in  the  minds  of  the 
Japanese  a  profound  suspicion  of  the  American  motive  in  precipitating 
a  discussion  of  the  Far  Eastern  problem.  They  accuse  the  United 
vStates  of  promoting  an  aggressive  policy,  dangerous  to  the  future  se- 
curity both  of  Japan  and  China,  under  the  pretence  of  protecting  China. 
It  is  important,  consequently,  to  establish  early  in  the  Conference  the 
good  faith  of  this  country  by  some  unequivocally  self-denying,  disarming 
and  soothing  proposal.  Its  substance  should  consist  in  a  plan  for  the 
drastic  reduction  of  naval  armaments  in  the  Pacific,  this  reduction  to  be 
shared  on  practically  equal  terms  by  the  three  powers  and  to  endure  for 
a  definite  number  of  years.  But  it  should  be  explicitly  affirmed  as  part 
of  its  agreement  to  disarm  that  the  object  of  the  reduction  is  to  remove 
the  obstacles  to  the  creation  of  a  concert  of  Pacific  powers  based  upon 
an  understanding  about  the  future  of  China. 

The  American  government,  if  it  is  seeking  in  good  faith  to  lay  the 
foundations  for  peace  and  order  in  the  Far  East,  has  much  to  gain 
and  nothing  to  lose  by  starting  the  Conference  with  a  proposal  of  its 
own  for  partial  disarmament.  It  can  use  its  existing  navy  as  the  in- 
strument of  two  possible  strategic  objects  in  the  Pacific.  One  would 
be  the  protection  of  its  own  coasts  and  the  Panama  Canal  against  of- 
fensive operations  by  a  hostile  fleet.  The  other  would  be  the  defence  of 
the  Philippines  and  China  against  an  attack  by  a  combined  fleet  and 
army.  The  first  of  these  objects  would  be  accomplished  even  more  ef- 
fectively by  a  general  limitation  of  naval  armament  than  it  would  be 
by  the  existing  American  navy.  The  other  object  places  an  excessive 
strain  upon  the  American  navy  as  it  exists  or  as  it  will  exist  when  the 
present  program  of  new  construction  is  finished.  The  defence  of  China 
or  the  Philippines  against  Japan  exceeds  the  power  of  any  American 
fleet  which  is  not  half  larger  than  that  of  Japan  and  which  is  not  pro- 
vided with  an  impregnable  naval  base  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pacific. 

If  the  United  States  prepares  to  defend  either  the  Philippines  or 
China  in  the  event  of  war  with  Japan,  it  will  have  to  build  a  veritable 
Gibraltar  on  the  island  of  Guam  and  to  seek  a  greater  preponderance 
in  capital  ships  than  its  existing  program  of  new  construction  provides. 
The  Navy  Department  has  frequently  proposed  for  this  reason  the  cre- 
ation of  such  a  base  in  Far  Eastern  waters,  but  Congress  has  never  con- 
sented and  it  never  should  consent.  For  if  the  United  States  was  ade- 
quately  prepared   to    defend   China   and   the   Philippines,   it    would   b'e 

[14] 


equally  well  prepared  to  attack  Japan.  An  adequate  American  naval 
base  at  Guam  would  be  as  dangerous  to  Japan  as  a  Japanese  naval  base 
somewhere  on  the  Mexican  coast  would  be  to  the  United  States. 

The  American  nation  cannot  afford  to  flourish  such  a  threat  against 
the  Japanese  nation.  Japan  in  spite  of  her  large  armament  is  a  poor 
and  much  less  powerful  country  than  the  United  States.  She  has  more 
reason  to  fear  us  than  we  have  to  fear  her,  and  for  that  reason  the 
American  government  should  carefully  refrain  from  giving  her  justi- 
fiable cause  for  alarm.  If  the  Japanese  government  should  lease  Mag- 
dalena  Bay  from  Mexico  and  announce  its  intention  of  building  on  its 
property  a  naval  base,  the  American  government  would  consider  the 
act  an  evidence  of  a  hostile  intention  and  declare  war  rather  than  al- 
low the  operation  to  proceed.  The  fortification  of  Guam  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  naval  base  on  that  island  would  be  almost  as  dangerous 
to  Japan  as  would  the  occupation  of  Magdalena  Bay  by  Japan  for  mili- 
tary and  naval  purposes  be  dangerous  to  the  United  States.  The  two 
cases  would  possess  minor  differences  of  some  importance.  Yet  if  Con- 
gress appropriated  the  money  for  the  fortification  of  Guam,  Japan  would 
have  as  fair  an  excuse  in  the  interest  of  her  safety  to  declare  war  on 
the  United  States  as  the  United  States  would  in  the  other  event  to 
declare  war  on  Japan. 

In  managing  the  coming  Conference  the  first  object  of  the  American 
government  should  be  to  prove  to  Japan  that  she  has  no  reason  to  fear 
us,  that  we  do  not  propose  to  use  the  defence  of  China  as  an  excuse 
for  attacking  her.  The  American  government  can  allay  Japanese  sus- 
pision  by  promising  not  to  fortify  Guam  or  to  establish  any  naval  base 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Pacific  which  would  enable  the  American  fleet 
to  assume  control  of  those  waters.  Such  a  promise  coupled  with  a 
proposal  to  limit  existing  armaments  would  begin  by  placing  the  discus- 
sion on  the  plane  not  of  a  contest  of  forces  but  a  meeting  and  a  com- 
parison of  minds.  Unless  the  discussion  takes  place  on  a  plane  of  this 
kind,  it  can  only  harvest  a  meagre,  a  specious  or  a  fugitive  success. 

By  explicitly  and  finally  renouncing  the  plan  of  building  a  fortified 
naval  base  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pacific,  the  United  States  would 
finally  renounce  the  idea  of  coercing  Japan  by  means  of  a  naval  victory, 
but  it  would  not  renounce  the  idea  of  defending  China  against  foreign 
aggression.  It  would  merely  have  to  devise  other  and  better  means  of 
providing  the  protection.  A  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
undertaken  for  the  defence  of  China  would  create  conditions  likely  to 
increase  her  subjugation.  If  Japan  won,  the  Japanese  government  would 
apparently  be  entitled  to  seize  China  as  the  prize  of  victory  as  it  seized 
Korea  and  in  part  ]\Ianchuria  as  the  prizes  of  a  victorv  over  Russia.     If 

[15] 


Ik 


the  United  States  won,  its  victory  would  be  so  enormously  costly  that 
it  might  well  seek  compensation  at  China's  expense  as  well  as  Japan's. 
It  could  hardly  fail  to  become  as  dangerous  to  the  independence  of  its 
ward  as  was  its  enemy.  He  who  proposes  to  protect  China  by  a  costly 
war  is  a  poor  friend  of  China.  War  about  China  between  two  foreign 
powers  would  increase  China's  dependence  not  her  independence. 

The  only  real  security  for  her  independence  must  come  from  an  un- 
derstanding among  foreign  nations  about  her  status  and  future.  A  war 
would  not  promote  such  an  understanding  and  every  American  friend 
of  China  should  recognize  this  truth.  But  the  renunciation  of  naval 
and  military  coercion  of  Japan  would  not  imply  consent  to  Japanese  eco- 
nomic and  political  aggression  in  the  Far  East.  It  would  not  imply  the 
renunciation  of  explicit  and  stubborn  resistance  to  Japan  on  the  part 
of  the  American  government.  It  would  not  even  prevent  the  American 
government  from  bringing,  if  necessary,  another  kind  of  pressure  to 
bear  upon  a  Japanese  government  which  treated  beneficial  American 
proposals  with  respect  to  China  as  Japan  in  1910  treated  the  proposals  of 
President  Taft.  The  alternative  pressure  which  the  American  govern- 
ment can  use,  is  the  economic  political  and  .moral  isolation  of  Japan. 

The  isolation  by  American  diplomacy  of  a  stubbornly  unamenable 
Japan  would  inflict  on  the  Japanese  nation  a  calamity  almost  as  intoler- 
able as  military  and  naval  defeat.  The  psychology  of  Japan  is  that  of 
a  newcomer  in  the  society  of  civilized  nations.  The  Japanese  people 
are  imitative,  adaptable  and  most  anxious  to  please.  They  would  dread 
more  than  anything  else  the  loss  of  the  friendship  and  the  esteem  on 
the  part  of  Europeans  and  Americans  which  during  the  last  generation 
they  have  gradually  earned.  If  once  they  were  convinced  that  the  con- 
tinuation of  their  past  and  present  policy  in  China  would  bring  down 
upon  them  the  hostility  and  disapprobation  of  the  major  part  of  the 
civilized  world,  they  would  soon  become  more  amenable.  They  cannot 
afford  isolation.  Their  existing  power  is  built  up  on  European  assistance 
or  connivance  and  if  that  assistance  were  withdrawn,  they  would  lose 
both  prestige  and  self-confidence.  Their  policy,  as  they  very  well  know, 
has  made  them  most  unpopular  on  the  continent  of  Asia.  As  long  as 
they  are  allied  with  the  British  Empire,  they  are  not  afraid  of  the  conse- 
quences of  this  unpopularity,  but  once  they  are  isolated  they  would, 
despite  their  powerful  army  and  navy,  have  good  reason  to  be  afraid. 

Japanese  imperialism  in  China  is  the  creature  of  its  European  pre- 
decessor in  the  same  region.  The  Japanese  government  copied  its  for- 
eign policy  from  European  models  just  as  it  copied  its  ships,  its  steel 
mills  and  its  whole  technical  equipment.  It  has  played  the  game  of 
international  politics   according  to  the   rules  which  prevailed  when  it 

[16] 


entered  a  generation  ago.  Those  rules,  although  they  still  prevail  in 
European  diplomacy,  have  brought  a  hideous  calamity  upon  the  world. 
They  do  not  possess  their  former  authority.  It  is  necessary  that  they 
be  revised.  The  American  nation  wants  to  have  them  revised. 
Its  government  has  called  this  conference  to  see  whether  they 
cannot  be  revised  with  respect  to  a  region  near  the  United  States 
but  remote  from  Europe.  This  region  is  nearer  to  Japan  than  it  is  to 
the  United  States.  It  is  most  disturbing  and  dislocating  for  Japan  to 
accept  the  new  rules,  but  if  she  must  she  will.  She  cannot  play  a  lone 
hand  and  she  cannot  afford  to  h'e  excluded  from  good  international 
society.  And  in  the  long  run  the  new  rules  will  benefit  Japan  no  less 
than  China  and  the  United  States.  They  will  save  Japan  from  the  fate 
which  overtook  Germany  and  which  sooner  or  later  overtakes  all  peoples 
who  make  their  own  prestige  and  welfare  dependent  upon  the  domination 
and  exploitation  of  others. 

5.      ANGI.O-AMIJRICAN    CGOPEIRATION 

The  problem,  then,  of  the  American  delegation  after  it  has  proved 
its  good  faith  by  taking  the  initiative  in  disarming,  is  the  problem  of 
persuading  the  European  governments  to  join  the  American  government 
in  providing  for  the  protection  and  the  future  welfare  of  China.  The 
political  objects  which  American  diplomacy  has  always  sought  to  accom- 
plish in  the  Far  East  are  objects  which  can  only  be  thoroughly  accom- 
plished by  means  of  general  and  loyal  consent. 

There  is,  however,  one  European  government  and  people  who  need  not 
only  to  consent  to  the  plans  of  the  American  government  but  whose 
consent  must,  if  those  plans  are  to  succeed,  assume  the  form  of  active 
cooperation.     I  refer,  of  course,  to  Great  Britain. 

Until  recently  the  prospect  of  any  effective  diplomatic  cooperation  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  the  Ear  East  looked  ex- 
tremely doubtful.  The  British  Foreign  Office  was  wedded  to  the  alliance 
with  Japan.  That  contract  was  its  most  conspicuous  diplomatic  achieve- 
ment. It  had  during  a  troubled  period  been  extremely  useful  to  both 
partners  and  British  statesmen  were  most  reluctant  to  give  it  up.  British 
newspapers  talked,  consequently,  about  broadening  the  alliance  with 
Japan  to  include  the  United  States,  and  by  the  use  of  such  phrases  ex- 
hibited minds  entirely  untouched  by  the  American  grievance  against  the 
alliance.  Recently,  however,  the  British  government  has,  according  to 
the  newspapers,  taken  a  decision  which  looks  in  a  much  more  encouraging 
direction.  It  has  decided  to  concentrate  a  large  portion  of  its  battle  fleet 
in  Far  Eastern  waters.  Such  a  decision,  if  it  proves  to  be  true,  can  have 
only  one  meaning.     It  means  a  reversal  of  the  policy  adopted  by  the 

[17] 


Britisli  government  of  using  the  Japanese  fleet  as  its  agent  in  the  Far 
East.  Great  Britain  again  becomes  an  actual  instead  of  a  potential  naval 
power  in  the  Pacific.  As  an  actual  naval  power  she  can,  if  advisable, 
disagree  with  Japan  and  abandon  the  alliance  without  exposing  her  Far 
Kastern  possessions  to  Japanese  attack. 

It  looks,  consequently,  as  if  the  British  government  were  prepared  at 
least  under  some  conditions  to  give  up  the  alliance  with  Japan  and 
seek  a  new  basis  of  security  in  the  Far  East.  If  she  is,  the  one  in- 
superable obstacle  to  the  success  of  the  conference  has  disappeared. 
Anglo-American  cooperation  then  becomes  possible.  As  a  consequence 
it  also  becomes  possible  to  bring  pressure  upon  Japan  to  let  up  on  China 
without  threatening  war  in  the  event  of  her  refusal.  The  two  chief 
maritime  powers  could  isolate  Japan  morally  and  physically  and  deal 
a  fatal  blow  to  her  prestige  and  self-confidence. 

It  does  not,  of  course,  follow  that  the  two  English-speaking  powers 
will  cooperate  because  they  can.  Their  cooperation  will  depend  on  their 
ability  to  agree  upon  a  joint  definition  of  policy  with  respect  to  China 
and  upon  a  joint  method  of  rendering  the  policy  effective.  They  may 
very  well  fail  to  agree.  If  they  do  agree,  they  may  pay  an  excessively 
stifif  price  for  the  agreement.  The  Chinese  problem  is  extraordinarJiy 
difficult  and  complicated.  When  dealing  with  a  political  and  eco- 
nomic jungle  as  dense,  as  obscure,  and  as  dangerous  as  that  of  China, 
equally  well-informed,  intelligent  and  disinterested  men  are  bound  to 
differ.  In  so  far  as  the  negotiation  falls  into  the  hands  of  statesmen 
who  are  not  well-informed,  intelligent  and  disinterested,  the  area  of 
difference  threatens  to  be  hopelessly  unmanageable.  Such  being  the 
situation,  how  much  can  be  reasonably  expected  in  the  way  of  agree- 
ment? And  what  would  be  the  salient  characteristics  of  a  good  as 
compared  to  a  bad  agreement? 

6.      A    SUPREME    COUNCII,    FOR    THU    FAR    EAST 

The  most  formidable  obstacle  to  the  negotiation,  by  the  governments 
represented  in  the  Conference,  of  a  satisfactory  agreement  about  China 
consists  in  the  necessary  discrepancy  between  the  declared  purposes  of 
their  Chinese  policy  and  their  actual  position  and  interest  in  that  country. 
Inasmuch  as  they  represent  civilized  Christian  peoples  who  must  always 
look  morally  impeccable  to  themselves,  the  statesmen  assembled  in  Wash- 
ington will  have  to  assume  and  proclaim  that  their  national  policies  in 
China  respect  the  independence  and  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  the 
Chinese  nation.  The  proclamation  will  not  be  entirely  true.  All  these 
nations  will  by  cajolery,  fraud  or  force  have  obtained  political  or 
economic   concessions   which    impair    Chinese   independence   and    whicli 

[i8] 


contribute  not  to  the  welfare  of  the  Chinese  people  but  to  their  injury. 
They,  none  of  them,  can  come  to  the  Conference  with  entirely  clean 
hands.  Japan  has  merely  carried  further  and  longer  a  policy  which  all 
foreign  powers  have  practised  in  China.  Formerly  the  next  worst  offender 
to  Japan  was  Russia.  Now  that  Russia  is  down  and  out  the  British 
Empire  is  the  power  whose  vested  interests  in  China  are  most  inimical 
to  the  welfare  and  independence  of  that  country.  Is  it  likely  that  a 
group  of  governments  which  themselves  profit  from  Chinese  political 
impotence  will  agree  upon  any  thoroughgoing  and  satisfactory  plan  to 
cultivate  her  political  and  economic  independence? 

Almost  equally  formidable  is  the  obstacle  presented  by  the  lack  in 
China  of  any  one  authoritative  central  government.  The  Chinese  nation 
is  undergoing  an  economic,  political  and  social  revolution  which  will  last 
a  long  time  and  during  which  all  kinds  of  disorder  will  thrive  and  the 
country  will  be  torn  by  many  conflicting  centres  of  political  authority. 

Under  such  conditions  it  is  extremely  improbable  that  the  Conference 
will  or  can  reach  a  satisfactory  detailed  settlement  of  the  problem  of 
China.  Any  specific  settlement  which  the  conferees  could  now  reach 
would  have  to  recognize  and  perpetuate  too  many  undesirable  vested 
political  and  economic  interests.  It  might  take  the  form,  for  instance, 
of  confirming  the  Japanese  grip  on  Manchuria  and  Siberia  as  the  price 
of  withdrawing  from  Shantung,  or  of  recognizing  British  interests  in 
and  about  Hong  Kong  in  return  for  the  surrender  of  Weihaiwei.  A 
bargain  of  this  kind,  no  matter  how  many  powers  recognized  and  signed 
it,  would  not  constitute  a  settlement  any  more  than  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  was  a  settlement.  If  the  Conference  gives  birth  to  such  an 
abortion  it  will,  no  matter  how  much  it  accomplishes  in  the  way  of  limit- 
ing armaments,  make  eventually  more  for  war  than  peace.  The  friends 
of  China  and  of  order  in  the  Pacific  should  oppose  anything  of  the  kind 
as  uncompromisingly  as  they  opposed  the  cession  of  Shantung  to  Japan. 
The  only  possible  settlementt  is  one  which  looks  in  the  direction  of  assist- 
ing the  Chinese  people  to  become  as  much  the  master  of  their  own 
house  as  is  the  American  people.  If  the  Conference  cannot  forge  a 
specific  agreement  which  points  in  this  direction,  the  American  govern- 
ment should  at  least  block  any  agreement  which  would  prevent  the  ulti- 
mate adoption  of  such  a  program.  It  should  exclude  any  provision  which 
would  increase  the  obstacles  to  the  restoration  of  Chinese  independence. 

Anglo-American  cooperation,  however,  even  though  it  cannot  effect 
a  wholesome  detailed  settlement  of  the  Chinese  problem  may  still  induce 
the  Conference  to  move  towards  rather  than  away  from  the  ultimate 
emancipation  of  China.  The  American  government,  for  instance,  with 
English  backing  may  succeed  in  doing  away  with  such  a  gross  abuse  a*s 

[19] 


the  occupation  of  Shantung  and  such  an  intolerable  violation  of  Chinese 
independence  as  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  It  should  insist  on  the 
necessity  of  these  renunciations  as  the  only  decent  way  of  vindicating 
the  reality  of  the  principles  which  both  Japan  and  Great  Britain  have 
repeatedly  recognized  as  binding  on  themselves — the  principles  of  the 
political  independence  of  China  and  the  equality  of  all  naitions  in  their 
access  to  Chinese  markets.  Then  after  having  restored  a  little  vitality 
to  the  principles  of  right  which  have  been  so  often  repeated  and  so  little 
practised,  the  American  government  could  propose  as  the  next  logical 
step  the  constitution  of  a  permanent  council  of  the  Pacific  powers. 

This  Council  of  Far  Eastern  powers  would  consist  fundamentally  in 
a  permanent  edition  of  the  Conference  itself.  By  bringing  it  into  exist- 
ence the  Conference  would  recognize  at  once  the  limita'tion  of  its  possible 
achievement  at  any  one  :sitting,  yet  the  necessity  of  keeping  alive  a 
similar  body  to  deal  with  any  and  all  common  phases  of  the  Far  Eastern 
quesition.  The  several  members  of  the  Council  or  Concert  of  Far  East- 
ern powers  would  simply  agree  to  consult  one  another  about  their  future 
policies  with  respect  to  China  and  to  recognize  as  the  foundation  of 
their  common  action  the  twin  principles  of  cultivating  Chinese  independ- 
ence and  of  opening  the  door  into  China  to  all  nations  on  equal  terms. 
They  would  constitute  in  effect  a  political  consoritium  which  would 
supplement  the  financial  consortium  and  which  would  shut  out  independ- 
ent action  by  any  one  member  of  the  group.  But  this  poliltical  consortium 
would  have  to  prove  its  good  faith  from  the  start  by  admitting  China  to 
representation  in  its  councils.The  effective  value  of  the  Chinese  rep- 
resentation would  depend  upon  the  amount  of  coherence  which  the 
Chinese  are  able  to  infuse  into  their  political  organization,  but  even  if 
in  the  beginning  the  Chinese  delegation  represented  only  a  weak  and 
doubtful  centre  of  authority,  some  Chinese  government  should,  if  pos- 
sible, ibe  admitted  to  consultation.  Its  admission  would  give  the  Chinese 
a  motive  to  compose  their  differences  and  establish  a  recognizable  state. 

Almost  as  important  as  the  representation  of  China  in  the  con'sortium 
is  the  representation  of  Siberia.  At  the  present  moment  the  independence 
of  Siberia  is  being  threatened  quite  as  much  as  the  independence  of 
China;  and  the  continuation  of  the  threat  would  be  equally  dangerous 
to  future  peace  and  security  in  the  Far  East.  The  Siberians  are  a  people 
of  European  blood  and  culture  who  are  resident  in  the  East  and  who 
like  the  Australians  will  eventually  form  a  useful  medium  of  communi- 
cation between  the  East  and  the  West.  They  would  have  the  value 
of  contributing  to  the  Pacific  Concert  a  point  of  view  analogous  in 
economic  outlook  to  that  of  China — the  point  of  view,  that  is,  of  an 
economically  immature  land  power  which  needed  capital  for  develop- 

[20] 


ineiit.  Their  presence  in  the  Concert  would  diminish  the  preponderance 
in  that  body  of  the  maritime  as  contrasted  with  the  land  powers  and  so 
help  to  strengthen  its  balance. 

Many  American  friends  of  China  will  doobt  the  advisahility  of  such  a 
council  for  the  same  reasons  which  persuaded  them  to  oppose  the  financial 
consortium.  They  will  not  even  consider  the  admission  of  China  and 
Siberia  any  sufficient  guarantee  that  the  Concert  might  not  become  a 
huge  international  agency  of  exploitation  and  gradual  subjugation.  Tlicy 
will  fear  that  it  will  tie  the  hands  of  China's  friends  and  subject  them 
to  the  obligation  of  compromising  and  bargaining  with  China's  enemies. 
These  fears  may  be  well  founded.  The  beneficial  effect  of  such  an 
agency  as  the  proposed  Pacific  Concert  will  depend  upon  the  future 
triumph  of  humane  and  liberal  ideals  in  the  domestic  political  life  of  its 
members.  But  the  objection  is  not  conclusive.  The  United  States  and 
China  can  always  smash  the  Concert  by  resuming  their  liberty  of  action. 
In  the  meantime  it  binds  the  powers  which  are  preying  upon  China  no 
less  than  the  powers  which  are  not,  and  the  aggressive  powers  are  those 
which  for  the  present  need  binding.  It  is  extremely  important  during 
the  period  of  revolutionary  dislocation  in  China  that  individual  govern- 
ments be  prevented  from  using  the  political  disorder  as  an  excuse  for 
isolated  intervention.  If  the  Concert  endures  there  can  be  no  intervention 
without  general  consent;  and  this  will  enormously  increase  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  a  decision  in  its  favor.  The  friends  of  China  could  veto 
any  proposal  to  interfere.  They  would,  considering  the  differences  of 
interest  among  the  members  of  the  Concert,  have  a  fair  chance  to  block  it. 

But,  of  course,  the  Concert  would  fail,  if  in  the  long  run  inertia 
was  the  result  of  the  obligation  of  its  members  not  to  act  with- 
out consultation.  There  is  as  much  need  of  positive  orderly  change 
in  the  world  of  international  facts  as  in  the  world  of  domestic 
facts.  In  the  past  the  recognized  method  of  producing  change  in  the 
world  of  international  facts  was  a  successful  war,  and  nations  which 
were  coming  on  and  proposed  to  create  a  larger  place  for  themselves  in 
the  world,  such  as  Germany  or  Japan,  built  up  armies  and  navies  for  the 
purpose.  But  the  changes  produced  as  the  result  of  armaments  and 
successful  wars  are  unstable,  costly  and  often  undesirable.  The  con- 
science of  mankind  is  in  revolt  against  such  a  b'arbarouis  and  clumsy 
agency  of  international  legislation.  That  is  why  it  is  insisting  on  dis- 
armament. But  in  so  far  as  it  succeeds  in  limiting  armies  and  navies, 
it  must  provide  some  other  agency  for  producing  po'sitive  changes  in 
the  world  of  international  facts.  If,  for  instance,  the  Washington  Con- 
ference does  effect  a  considerable  reduction  of  the  navies  of  the  great 
maritime  powers,  it  must  create  some  permanent  agency  of  international 

[21] 


legi'slation  in  the  Far  East  other  than  armament  and  war.  The  Pacific 
Concert  must  in  the  long  run  be  able  to  bring  about  needed  and  desirable 
changes  as  the  result  of  conference  and  consent  or  else  it  will  fall  apart. 
Once  it  falls  apart  the  inevitable  alternative  is  re-armament  and  war. 

The  argument  that  the  Pacific  Concert,  if  it  is  to  survive,  must  be- 
come an  agency  of  beneficial  regional  international  legislation  does  not 
prophesy  that  it  will.  Perhaps  the  Washington  Conference  may  prefer 
a  false  and  inadequate  "•settlement"  to  the  promotion  of  an  understanding 
by  means  of  future  consultation.  Perhaps  if  it  does  set  up  a  Concert, 
the  Concert  will  degenerate  into  a  monotonous  repetition  of  meaningless 
sounds  or  will  finally  dissolve  into  an  outrageous  discord.  In  these 
matters  statesmanship  is  taking  long  chances  with  slippery  cards.  It  is 
important  not  to  expect  the  impossible.  But  it  is  still  more  important 
to  expect  and  to  demand  all  that  is  possible,  and  to  understand  what 
your  demand  means.  American  public  opinion  is  demanding  the  limita- 
tion of  armaments  as  a  long  stride  down  the  road  to  appeasement.  It 
does  well  to  demand  a  limitation  of  armaments,  b'ut  if  the  governmen'ts 
limit  armaments  without  providing  a  political  as  well  as  a  moral  equiva- 
lent for  larmies  and  navies  and  wars,  the  road  to  peace  through  dis- 
armament will  prove  to  be  a  blind  alley.  The  only  possible  political 
substitute  for  armies  and  navies  and  wars  is  organized  international 
conference.  It  is  a  dubious  and  clumsy  substitute,  but  it  is  the  best  there 
is,  and  if  it  is  not  better  than  it  is,  that  is  not  entirely  the  fault  either  of 
the  method  of  conference  or  the  good  faith  of  the  conferees.  It  is  far 
more  the  fault  of  public  opinion  which  asks  politicians  to  provide  a 
political  substitute  for  war  without  itself  providing  a  moral  substitute. 

7.      THi;    TEST    OF    SUCCESS 

In  'Starting  to  place  an  estimate  on  the  success  of  the  Conference, 
people  should  beware  of  subjecting  it  to  a  rigid  and  a  narrow  test.  It 
meets  for  the  purpose  of  limiting  armaments,  and  unless  it  succeeds  in 
limiting  naval  armaments,  it  will  most  egregiously  fail.  Yet  the  amount 
of  money  it  saves  in  naval  expenditure  will  not  constitute  a  dependable 
test  of  its  -success.  It  meets  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  an  agreement 
about  the  political  and  economic  problems  of  the  Far  East.  Yet  the 
completeness  and  definiteness  of  its  agreement  about  <the  future  of  China 
would  not  constitute  a  dependable  test  of  its  success.  If  it  is  to  succeed 
it  must  combine  some  measure  of  beneficial  legislation  on  behalf  of 
China  with  some  measure  of  disarmament.  Yet  even  if  it  succeeds  in 
effecting  this  combination,  a  friend  of  international  appeasement  would 
have  reason  not  to  remain  entirely  satisfied.  The  final  'test  of  its  success 
does  not  consist  in  definite  achievements,  important  as  these  are,  but  in 

[22] 


the  extent  to  which  it  vindicates  and  reassures  the  spirit  and  method  of 
Conference  in  the  conduct  of  international  affairs. 

The  extent  to  which  it  vindicates  and  reasserts  the  spirit  and  method 
of  Conference  will  depend  less  on  what  it  achieves  in  limiting  naval 
expenditures  and  in  legislating  about  the  Far  East  than  on  the  moral 
and  mental  atmosphere  in  which  these  specific  results  are  o'btained.  Any 
legislative  body,  if  it  reaches  an  important  decision,  bajs  to  pay  for  the 
decisive  result  by  a  discontented  minority.  A  Conference  is  a  legislative 
body  whose  success  depends  on  unanimous  consent,  and  the  obtaining 
of  unanimous  consent  demands  a  sacrifice  and  usually  a  defeat  for  some 
one  or  more  of  its  members.  The  Washington  Conference  will  be  no 
exception  to  this  rule.  If  it  is  to  agree,  either  the  American  or  the 
Japanese  government  mugt  yield,  and  the  loser  must  yield  as  the  result 
of  both  persuasion  and  pressure.  The  Conference  will  'succeed  if  the 
government  which  yields  creates  as  the  result  of  the  yielding  a  condition 
of  international  understanding  and  confidence  which  will  help  to  the 
future  adjustment  of  similar  clashes  by  the  same  means.  It  will  fail  if 
it  pays  for  its  unanimous  decisions  with  grievances,  irreconcilable 
animosities  and  mutual  distrust. 

The  Paris  Conference  failed  not  merely  because  so  many  of  its  de- 
cisions would  not  work  and  were  prompted  by  fear  and  ill-will,  but 
because  it  created  b'y  its  legislation  an  atmosphere  in  which  future  con- 
ference became  abortive.  Three  years  of  peace  have  left  the  vanquished 
unreconciled  and  almost  ruined.  It  has  left  the  victors  as  much  divided 
one  from  another  as  they  are  from  their  former  enemy.  The  prevailing 
temper  of  European  nations  with  respect  to  one  another  is  one  of  im- 
patience, animosity,  suspicion  and  recrimination.  They  are  prevented 
from  flying  at  one  another's  throats  by  impotence  rather  than  goodwill. 
If  this  atmosphere  continues  to  prevail,  it  is  hard  to  'see  how  the  whole 
of  Europe  can  escape  the  ruin  which  is  already  descending  on  the 
vanquished.  It  must  not  be  allowed  to  continue.  The  European  nations 
have  not  yet  come  to  see  the  necessity  of  assembling  in  another  confer- 
ence and  in  writing  a  new  body  of  public  law  which  may  at  least  obtain 
its  sanction  from  consent  rather  than  force.  But  they  are  headed  in 
that  direction;  and  the  Washington  Conference,  even  though  it  cannot 
deal  directly  with  European  problems,  may  be  of  great  assistance  to  them 
by  affording  to  the  world  an  example  of  the  kind  of  leadership  which 
can  make  conference  a  successful  instrument  of  international  concord. 

President  Harding  and  Secretary  Hughes  have,  I  think,  a  rare  and  a 
good  opportunity  of  displaying  the  needed  leadership.  They  hold  strong 
cards  and  if  they  play  them  well  they  can  make  the  Conference  a  success 
according  to  the  only  final  test  of  success.    They  can  prove  that  confer- 

[23] 


ence,  wisely,  shrewdly  and  firmly  managed,  is  capable  of  b'ecoming  a 
substitute  for  navies,  armies  and  wars.  The  vindication  in  Washington 
of  conference  as  a  substitute  for  war  is  for  the  American  delegation  a 
great,  a  relevant  and  lan  entirely  possible  achievement.  Their  countrymen 
have  the  right  to  ask  for  as  much  and  should  not  be  satisfied  with  less. 

Public  Opinion  in  Japan 

by  John  Dewey 

WHILE  in  Tokio  I  listened  to  an  interesting  conversation  be- 
tween a  Japanese  and  a  visiting  Chinese  educationalist.  The 
former  was  a  true,  not  a  pseudo-liberal.  He  had  been  in 
China  and  had  kept  his  eyes  open.  Ever  since  his  visit  he  has  been  a 
critic  of  Japan's  course  in  China;  he  admitted  freely  the  wrong  policy 
of  his  own  country  and  the  need  of  going  further  in  the  changes  which, 
he  said,  Hara,  the  prime  minister,  had  already  entered  upon  and  which 
he  would  extend  were  he  not  hampered  and  checked  by  the  militarists. 
But  he  insisted  that  China  and  Japan  were  so  near  to  each  other  and  so 
intimately  connected  with  each  other,  that  Japan  must  have  a  relation 
to  China  different  from  that  of  any  other  country.  For,  he  insisted, 
everything  that  happened  in  China  directly  influenced  the  well  being 
of  Japan,  while  even  extraordinary  events  there  had  next  to  no  rever- 
berations in  other  countries. 

The  reply  of  the  Chinese  was  to  say  that  Japan  worried  altogether 
too  much  about  China  and  what  happened  there,  that  its  anxiety  was 
almost  morbid,  and  that  the  Japanese  would  best  serve  their  country 
by  caring  less  about  what  was  going  on  over  on  the  mainland,  and  per- 
mitting the  Chinese  to  do  more  of  the  worrying  about  their  own  affairs. 
And  when  my  Japanese  friend  reiterated  the  fact  that  the  close  connec- 
tion of  the  two  countries  made  such  indifference  out  of  the  question, 
our  Chinese  friend  retorted  that  the  Japanese  would  do  hetiter  to  pay 
more  attention  to  their  own  problems  and  worry  more  about  their  own 
troubles;  that  the  problems  and  evils  of  Japan  were  quite  as  serious 
as  those  of  China,  the  only  difference  being  that  the  former  were  cov- 
ered up  while  the  latter  were  exposed  to  all  the  world. 

I  am  not  sure  that  the  retort,  which  with  its  counterattack  reduced 
the  Japanese  liberal  to  silence,  was  not  exaggerated.  But  it  is  worth 
quoting  as  an  indication  of  the  great  difference  between  Japanese  and 
Chinese  public  opinion.  Intellectually  China  has  the  advantage  of  a 
weak  and  corrupt  government.  Publicity  regarding  the  country's  evils, 
domestic  and  international,  flourishes.  The  uniform  attitude  of  the  edu- 
cated class  toward  their  government  and  toward  social  affairs  is  critical. 

[24I 


Perhaps  the  most  signihcant  single  fact  about  the  present  culture  of 
China  is  that  not  only  the  reactionary  but  the  conservative  class  has  no 
intellectual  spokesman.  Every  thinker,  every  writer,  every  articulate 
conscious  influence  rs  liberal.  The  fact  is  the  more  striking  because  the 
reactionary  and  mihtaristic  faction  is  in  control  of  every  branch  of  gov- 
ernment save  the  foreign  office.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  world  offers 
a  parallel  for  such  a  combination  of  political  power  in  actual  control 
with  intellectual  and  moral  weakness,  futility,  non-resistence.  Even  the 
traditional  Confucian  thought  of  China  has  no  first-class  representative 
at  the  present  time.  Confucianism  is  of  course  still  strong,  but  its 
strength  is  that  of  custom,  not  that  of  thought  or  intellectual  influence. 
I  have  referred  elsewhere  to  the  "Literary  Revolution,"  the  move- 
ment to  substitute  the  words  and  style  of  the  vernacular  for  that  of  the 
classic  writings.  The  leaders  told  me  that  they  expected  to  have  to 
struggle  and  be  highly  unpopular  for  at  least  ten  years.  But  to  their 
surprise  the  movement  went  like  wild-fire;  all  of  the  younger  educated 
classes  rallied  at  once  to  their  standard.  The  movement  has  slowed  up 
in  the  last  year  or  so;  but  its  lessened  pace  is  due  to  the  unconscious 
inertia  of  stubborn  custom  rather  than  to  any  articulate  intellectual  op- 
position or  criticism.  This  incident  seems  to  me  typical.  There  seems 
to  be  no  country  in  the  world  where  students  are  so  unanimously  and 
eagerly  interested  as  in  China  in  What  is  modern  and  new  in  thought, 
especially  about  social  and  economic  matters,  nor  where  the  arguments 
which  can  be  brought  in  favor  of  the  established  order  and  the  status 
quo  have  so  little  weight — indeed,  are  'so  unuttered. 

This  state  of  affairs  suggests  by  contrast  the  obstacles  with  which  the 
development  of  an  enliglitened  liberal  public  opinion  in  Japan  has  to 
contend.  In  Japan  the  government  is  strong,  administration  is  centralized 
and  organized,  and  opinion  is  drilled  and  disciplined.  As  a  consequence 
critical  thought  is  timid  and  on  the  defensive,  while  the  natural  course  is  to 
defend  the  existing  status  and  national  policies.  Not  only  is  patriotism  a 
religion,  but  religion  is  literally  patriotic  and  nationalistic.  Patriotism 
and  institutional  religion  are  both  of  them  so  notoriously  hostile  to  criti- 
cal thought  and  free  discussion  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  picture 
to  oneself  their  suppressive  and  silencing  effect  when  they  are  combined 
in  one.  It  takes  more  force,  more  moral  courage  to  be  an  outspoken 
critic  of  the  politics  and  social  condition  of  one's  nation,  to  be  a  dis- 
senter, in  Japan,  than  in  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

All  the  more  honor,  then,  to  those  liberals  in  Japan  whose  insight 
and  courage  is  slowly  forcing  a  change.  We  were  not  long  in  Japan 
upon  our  return  trip  to  America  and  I  do  not  profess  to  speak  with  any 
authority,  but  the  change  in  atmosphere  since  we  were  in  that  country 

[25] 


two  years  ago  is  unmistakable.  The  ominous  hush  that  seemed  then 
to  have  settled  down  is  now  punctuated  with  words  spoken  aloud  and 
some  of  them  shouted  forth.  Whether  the  number  of  liberal  critics  or 
their  concrete  influence  has  increased,  I  do  not  know.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  taboo  which  surrounded  articulate  discussions  of  Japan's  foreign 
policies  and  of  fundamental  domestic  conditions  is  breaking  down.  I 
do  not  refer  to  those  official  apologisits  and  semi-official  propagandists 
who  meet  you  more  than  half-way  with  their  candid  assertion  that  Japan 
is  human  and  has  made  mistakes — "blunders"  is  the  favorite  word — in 
China,  Korea  and  Siberia,  and  that  till  towards  the  end  of  the  war  the 
military  bureaucracy  had  too  much  power,  but  that  Japan  is  now  en- 
gaged in  remedying  these  mistakes  as  fast  as  she  can.  Regarding  such 
talk  a  certain  amount  of  cynicism  is  justified.  It  comes  from  those 
whom  the  Japan  Chronicle  calls  tame  liberals,  and  of  whom  it  says  in 
effect  that  while  they  indulge  in  academic  criticism  of  the  militarist 
party,  they  rush  to  arms  the  moment  it  is  a  question  of  a  surrender  of 
any  of  the  concrete  advantages  which  the  militarists  have  secured  for 
Japan  in  China  and  Siberia.  Reference  is  rather  to  the  gradual  breaking 
down  of  the  conspiracy  of  silence,  the  relaxation  of  that  tension  which 
made  allusion  to  certain  subjects  an  unholy  thing,  and  which  forced 
one  who  wished  to  be  courteous,  to  confine  his  conversations  about  Japan 
to  the  things  upon  which  one  could  be  conscientiously  complimentary. 

In  the  absence  of  adequate  opportunities  for  study,  the  reasons  for 
the  changed  attitude  can  only  be  roughly  sketched.  In  a  general  way 
the  greatest  force  is  doubtless  the  reverberations  of  the  war.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that  the  intellectual  and  moral  lessons  of  the  war  have  been 
felt  in  the  Orient  in  inverse  ratio  to  actual  participation  in  it.  I  should 
say  that  this  is  true  of  China,  and  I  fancy  it  is  true  in  some  measure  of 
Japan.  Specifically,  the  whole  Siberian  expedition  has  been  unpopular 
from  the  start.  It  has  become  increasingly  so  as  expenditures  have 
mounted — the  lowest  estimate  I  heard  was  half  a  billion  dollars — ^and 
there  were  no  tangible  results  of  advantage,  for  the  taking  over  of  Sag- 
halien  and  Vladivostok  has  not  affected  the  popular  imagination  except 
to  create  an  uneasy  feeling  that  there  may  be  a  day  of  reckoning  ahead. 
Again  the  continuing  volume  of  protest  from  China  has  had  an  effect, 
and  the  boycott,  even  if  it  turned  out  largely  a  practical  failure,  still 
gave  the  Japanese  furiously  to  think  about  their  Chinese  relations.  The 
free  growth  of  liberal  thought  in  China  has  had  some  effect.  The  con- 
trast of  Bertrand  Russell  as  a  welcome,  honored  and  influential  figure 
in  China,  and  as  entering  Japan  only  to  the  accompaniment  of  an  apology 
from  the  chief  of  safety  for  permitting  him  to  enter  at  all,  is  acutely 
impressed  upon  the  minds  of  Japanese  intellectuals.    Then  the  inevitable 

[26] 


growth  of  a  scientific  spirit  among  the  highly  eckicated  is  a  factor.  The 
home  of  the  hberal  movement  is  in  the  universities,  the  normal  and 
lower  ^schools  not  b'eing  as  yet  much  affected;  and  it  is  said  that  a  major- 
ity of  the  faculty  of  Political  Science  of  the  Imperial  University  are 
now  active  liberals.  A  more  tangible  factor  is  the  persistence  of  labor 
troubles  and  the  growth  of  a  class  consciousness  on  the  part  of  laborers 
in  shipyards  and  factories.  And  the  steady  increase  of  taxes  due  mainly  )y 
to  the  enlarged  naval  budget  is  not  without  influence. 

A  westerner  may  deplore  the  rudimentary  and  distorted  character  of 
public  opinion  in  his  own  country.  But,  after  all,  he  is  so  used  to  the 
operation  of  regular  organs  of  discussion  that  it  is  almost  impossible  for 
him  to  realize  the  spasmodic,  immature  and  disorganized  nature  of  po- 
litical opinion  in  the  Orient.  Hence  in  judging  events  he  fails  to  make 
proper  allowances,  and  often  finds  design  where  there  is  only  ignorance. 
In  Japan  the  nation,  the  emperor,  is  about  the  only  enduring  and  or- 
ganized centre  for  public  opinion.  Naturally  this  fact  accrues  to  the 
advantage  of  imperialism;  there  is  so  little  of  anything  else  about  which 
people  can  feel  and  think  in  a  consistent  and  unified  way.  Moreover 
the  military-bureaucratic  party  is  the  only  organized  group  which  has  a 
definite  and  permanent  policy.  The  late  prime  minister,  Mr.  Hara,  was 
the  first  commoner  to  hold  that  office,  and  this  fact  has  been  adver- 
tised as  the  beginning  of  real  democracy  in  government.  But  the  one 
thing  upon  which  observers  agree  is  that  Hara  ihad  no  policy  except 
opportunism  of  a  very  immediate  sort  whether  as  to  foreign  affairs 
or  as  to  the  acute  internal  labor  and  industrial  problems. 

And  if  one  stops  to  think,  one  will  find  it  difficult  in  the  present  con- 
dition of  Japan  to  construct  even  in  imagination  a  coherent  and  unswerv- 
ing working  policy  for  a  truly  liberal  political  party  in  that  country.    An 
avowed  liberal  course  would  almost  assuredly  arouse  general  popular 
j    hostility.     For  no  matter  how  pacific  is  the  great  mass  of  the  Japanese  v 
\    people — and  I  think  that  temperamentally  they  are  peace  loving — there 
is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  every  step  in  the  advancement  and  con- 
[    solidation  of  Japan  as  a  political  unit  has  come  as  a  result  of  war.    The 
j    war  with  China  had  the  abolition  of  extra-territoriality  as  its  result. 
The  war  with  Russia  gave  to  Japan  Korea,  a  foothold  in  Manchuria  and 
a  standing  among  the  powers.     The   last  war — which   some   Japanese 
publications  uniformly  refer  to  as  the  Japo-German  war — made  her  one 
of  the  five  powers,  besides  giving  her  a  hold  on  Shantung,  a  goodly 
j    number  of  Pacific  islands  and  a  big  accretion  of  bullion  and  trade.     In 
addition,  the  people  themselves  have  never  experienced  the  horrors  of 
modern  war.    Add  to  these  positive  facts  the  outstanding  fact  that  even 
a  Japanese  liberal  has  good  reason  to  believe  that  in  the  predatory  ex- 

[27] 


pansion  of  modern  imperialistic  Europe,  her  army  and  navy  have  alone 
saved  Japan  from  becoming  another  India  or  China,  and  one  begins 
to  sense  why  in  any  crisis  public  opinion  moves  tO'  the  side  of  the  mili- 
tary party.  Over  and  over  again  newspapers  which  indulge  in  harsh 
general  criticism  of  the  military  party  take  the  side  of  the  militarists 
in  any  concrete  issue  that  arises — the  case  of  Siberia  is  the  only  excep- 
tion that  occurs  to  me. 

On  general  principles  one  might  have  thought  that  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  Japan — her  industrialization — would  have  created  a  defi- 
nite trend  of  opinion,  formed  a  positive  centre  and  organ  of  sentiment 
and  thought,  which  in  some  respects  would  be  as  coherent  as  the  im- 
perialistic centre  and  organs,  even  if  not  actively  opposed  to  it.  But 
in  Japan  there  is  no  definite  line  between  private  and  government  eco- 
nomic activity.  Japan  has  outdone  Germany  in  mixing  governmental 
support  and  aid  with  all  capitalistic  enterprises.  The  big  corporations 
engage  in  a  combination  of  mining,  shipping  and  banking  activities, 
along  with  manufacturing  and  continental  concessions,  and  the  govern- 
ment, or  some  group  of  families  which  is  influential  in  government,  is 
definitely  allied  with  the  big  corporations.  Hence  up  to  the  present  the 
industrialisation  of  Japan  has  not  created  any  definite  trend  of  public 
opinion.  There  is  no  mercantile  or  financial  consciousness  as  such.  If 
things  go  on  at  the  present  rate,  the  laboring  class  will  crystallize  a  new 
centre  of  opinion  in  the  near  future,  but  at  present  it  is  inchoate. 

I  do  not  know  that  any  clear  moral  emerges  from  this  survey.  If 
there  is  one,  it  is  in  line  with  the  remark  made  earlier  about  the  impor- 
tance of  enlightened  foreign  publicity  and  opinion  in  its  reflex  influence 
upon  Japan.  J_aj)an  needs  symp)athy,  not  abuse;  but  it  is  an  unkind 
sympathy  which  exerts  itself  in  justifying  the  existing  order,  and  in 
effect  maintains  the  policy  of  secrecy  which  keeps  evils  covered  up. 
True  sympathy  will  pursue  the  opposite  course  of  revealing  the  domi- 
nating hold  which  military  bureaucracy  has  upon  Japanese  life,  internal 
and  international.  This  course  will,  however,  be  comparatively  inef- 
fectual in  influencing  the  formation  of  public  opinion  in  Japan  unless 
it  is  united  with  a  firm  stand  against  every  kind  of  racial  discrimination. 
Young  men  in  Japan  who  are  genuinely  hostile  to  existing  militarism 
say  frankly  that  when  it  comes  to  discriminations  against  the  Japanese 
simply  because  they  are  a  yellow  race,  they  will  fight  to  the  last,  even 
if  it  means  uniting  themselves  with  a  militaristic  party  which  they  abhor. 

It  was  a  tragedy  that  the  Versailles  Conference  could  not  find  a  for- 
mula of  race  equality  consistent  with  securing  to  every  country  the 
right  to  determine  its  own  reception  of  immigrants.  If  the  United  States 
in  the  Pacific  Conference  really  wants  to  lessen  the  hold  of  the  mili- 

[28] 


I 


tarists  upon  public  opinion  in  Japan  it  will  not  wait  for  Japan  to  intro- 
duce a  formula  of  equality  of  racial  rights,  much  less  turn  it  down 
when  it  is  introduced.  A  slight  amount  of  ingenuity  combined  with 
sympathy  can  readily  find  a  formula  which  will  indicate  that  because 
of  racial  equahty,  not  in  spite  of  it,  each  country  has  the  right  to  decide 
its  own  policy  of  immigration.  One  can  sympathize  with  the  attitude 
of  the  Pacific  Coast  upon  the  matters  of  the  restriction  of  Oriental  im- 
migration, and  yet  believe  that  every  step  taken  by  a  Coast  state  which 
involves  inequality  of  treatment  for  immigrants  already  in  residence  in- 
volves the  danger  of  an  ultimate  explosion  in  the  Pacific.  Not  that 
Japan  would  go  to  war  about  the  Calif ornian  issue,  but  that  every  mova 
that  partakes  of  racial  discrimination  strengthens  that  public  opinion 
which  in  the  last  resort  is  the  reliance  of  the  military  group  in  Japan. 
The  rankling  sense  of  injustice  is  played  upon  to  secure  support  for  a 
big  army  and  navy.  The  indirect  outcome  is  the  continuation  of  a  pre- 
datory policy  in  China  and  Siberia.  And  it  is  the  latter  policy  which 
carries  with  it  the  menace  of  future  war.  A  frank  facing  of  the  question 
of  racial  equality  is  good  diplomatic  tactics.  It  is  the  poorest  of  policies 
to  hand  gratutiously  a  grievance  to  a  potential  opponent.  But  the  is- 
sue is  deeper  and  broader  than  that  of  diplomatic  tactics  or  even  strategy. 
Until  the  world  in  general  and  the  United  States  in  particular  does  the 
square  thing  about  racial  discrimination,  the  militarists  will  remain  the 
formative  power  in  Japanese  public  opinion.  Liberal  and  pacific  opinion 
will  be  crippled. 

The  British  View 

by  George  Glasgow 

■  A  LL  sections  of  British  opinion,  except  perhaps  that  of  the  ex- 
/  \  treme  Left,  welcome  the  significance  of  the  official  title  which 
A.  J^has  been  given  to  the  forthcoming  Conference  at  Washington. 
It  was  better  to  be  precise  at  the  outset,  and  to  call  it,  not  a  "disarma- 
ment Conference,  but  one  "for  the  Limitation  of  Armaments."  There 
may  b'e  something  to  be  said  for  the  policy  of  aiming  at  the  moon  to 
hit  the  top  of  a  tree,  but  good  marksmen  take  a  different  view.  What 
indeed  has  been  the  chief  fear  of  practical  British  statesmen  is  that 
the  Conference  should  ride  off  on  platitudes,  and  spend  itself  ineffec- 
tively. There  is  serious  business  to  be  done.  When,  therefore,  the 
American  Ambassador  in  London  declared  that  "disarmament"  at  the 
present  time  necessarily  means  nothing  more  than  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ments, we  received  solid  confirmation  of  what  we  had  always  believed; 
that  the  Washington  Conference  was  to  be  a  business-like  affair. 

[29] 


/• 


I.     A  POST-WAR  Example 

A  frank  statement  of  the  British  case  could  not  be  made  without 
first  recording  the  impression  made  on  British  opinion,  both  official  and 
unofficial,  by  American  policy  since  the  war.  The  British  people  are 
quick  to  appreciate  sportsmanship.  By  all  the  rules  of  international  op- 
portimism,  as  they  have  traditionally  held  good,  the  United  States  would 
have  been  justified  in  driving  home  her  post-war  advantage.  She  could 
have  decided  to  build  a  navy  of  decisive  superiority,  and  to  present 
the  world  with  a  fait  accompli.  She  could  have  done  it  easily,  and  would 
not  thereby  have  transgressed  the  accepted  canons  of  international  form. 
Instead  she  chose  to  organize  a  conference  with  the  object  of  arriving 
at  an  understanding  which  would  relieve  both  herself  and  her  possible 
rivals  of  the  insensate  burden  of  competitive  armaments,  and  by  the 
same  token  would  make  good  sense,  and  not  b'rute  strength,  the  arbiter 
of  the  future.     Such  is  the  true  idealism  of  the  United  States. 

Nor  need  British  appreciation  of  it  be  an  empty  sentiment.  We  too 
have  practised  disarmament.  The  British  army  of  1918  no  longer  ex- 
ists. Conscription  is  gone.  The  Admiralty  has  consented  to  abandon 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  Two-Power  standard,  and  has  already  taken 
the  necessary  steps  to  reduce  the  number  of  capital  ships,  cruisers, 
destroyers  and  submarines  in  this  sense.  If  disarmament  at  the  present 
time  means  in  effect  the  Hmitation  of  armamenlts.  Great  Britain  may 
claim  a  prominent  place  in  the  movement.  To  appreciate  this,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  British  navy  in  the  past  has  had  more  than  one 
duty  to  perform.  It  is  not  only  necessary  for  maintaining  the  security 
of  the  Empire,  for  maintaining  the  communications  between  the  British 
Isles  and  the  Dominions  and  between  the  Dominions  themselves,  but  the 
forty-seven  millions  who  live  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  dependent 
in  the  last  resort  on  the  British  navy  for  their  food.  Four-fifths  of  our 
bread,  and  one-half  of  our  meat  come  from  overseas. 

2.      BRITAIN   AND   JAPAN 

The  crux  of  the  Conference  is  to  be  the  future  relations  of  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  China.  It  is  frankly  recognized  here 
that  the  discussion  must  centre  very  largely  round  the  question  of  the 
Anglo- Japanese  alliance. 

Before  the  British  attitude  to  this  question  can  be  understood,  it  is 
necessary  to  recall  the  significance  of  a  recent  development  in  the  evo- 
lution of  the  British  Empire.  In  July  of  this  year  there  met  in  London 
a  conference  of  British  Empire  Prime  Ministers.  They  met  as  equals 
in  the  discussion  of  a  common  foreign  policy.  As  ]\Ir.  Lloyd  George 
said   at   the  beginning  of  the  conference:     "There   was  a  time   when 

[30] 


Downing  Street  controlled  the  Empire;  today  the  Empire  gives  orders 
to  Downing  Street."  That  is  a  fact  of  importance  which  has  clearly 
to  be  kept  in  mind  when  the  question  of  British  foreign  pohcy  arises. 

At  that  conference  there  were  three  main  points  of  view  expressed. 
The  first  is  what  may  he  called  the  view  of  the  London  government. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself  has  since  crystallized  it  in  words  which  are 
perhaps  worth  quoting  in  some  detail.     On  July  nth  he  said: 

In  Japan  we  have  an  old  and  proved  ally,  and  the  Agreement  of 
twenty  years'  standing  between  us  has  been  of  very  great  benefit, 
not  only  to  ourselves  and  her,  but  to  the  peace  of  the  Far  East. 

In  China  there  is  a  very  numerous  people,  v^ith  great  potentialities, 
who  esteem  our  friendship  highly  and  whose  interests  we  on  our 
side  desire  to  assist  and  advance. 

In  the  United  States  we  see  today,  as  we  have  always  seen,  a 
people  closest  to  our  own  in  aims  and  ideals,  with  whom  it  is  for  us 
not  merely  a  desire  and  an  interest,  but  a  deeply  rooted  instinct, 
to  consult  and  cooperate. 

The  object  of  our  discussions  (at  the  Empire  Conference)  was 
to  find  a  method  of  comibining  all  these  three  factors  in  a  policy 
which  would  remove  the  danger  of  heavy  naval  expenditure  in  the 
Pacific,  with  all  the  evils  which  such  expenditure  entails,  and  would 
ensure  the  development  of  all  legitimate  national  interests  in  the 
Far  East. 

The  first  principle  of  our  policy  was  friendly  cooperation 
with  the  United  States,  and  we  were  all  convinced  that  upon  this 
more  than  upon  any  other  single  factor  depend  ;the  peace  and  well- 
being  of  the  world.  We  also  desired  to  maintain  our  close  friend- 
ship and  cooperation  with  Japan.  We  also  aimed  at  preserving 
the  open  door  in  China  and  at  giving  the  Chinese  people  every  op- 
portunity for  peaceful  progress  and  development.  In  addition  to 
these  consideratiou's  we  desired  to  safeguard  our  own  vital  interests 
in  the  Pacific,  and  to  preclude  any  competition  in  naval  armaments 
between  the  Pacific  Powers. 

These  of  cotrrse  are  general  sentiments  which  remain  to  be  trans- 
lated into  practical  politics.  First  let  us  face  the  difficulties  created  by 
the  views  of  the  Canadian  and  Australian  delegations  expressed  at  the 
London  conference.     There  was  a  certain  divergence  between  them, 

Canada  was  opposed  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  on  the  grounds 
that  (i)  it  conflicted  with  our  friendship  with  America;  (2)  it  rendered 
difficult  the  problem  of  Japanese  immigration;  (3)  it  had  in  any  case 
done  its  work;  (4)  there  was  no  more  call  for  an  Anglo-Japanese  al- 
liance than  for  an  alliance  with  the  United  Sta;tes,  France  or  Italy,  if 
its  only  object  was  to  safeguard  friendly  relations;  (5)  that,  in  general, 
entangling  alliances  are  in  conflict  with  the  new  spirit  of  international 
relations  as  expressed  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations;  (6) 

[31] 


that  the  renewal  of  the  alHance  with  Japan  would  bring  with  it  the 
cniishing  burden  and  the  certain  disaster  of  an  armaments  race  with 
America.  In  support  of  her  general  contention  Canada  pointed  out 
with  great  effect  that  she  had  a  common  frontier  with  the  United  States 
of  more  than  five  and  a  half  thousand  miles,  unguarded  on  both  sides; 
what  better  proof  of  the  efficacy  of  mutual  confidence  as  an  alternative 
to  military  alliances,  even  from  the  point  of  view  of  security? 

Australia  on  the  other  hand  defended  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance 
on  the  double  ground  that  (i)  it  was  disloyal  to  throw  over  a  proved 
friend,  and  (2)  the  alliance  was  the  best  and  most  economical  means 
of  eliminating  po'ssible  misunderstandings  with  Japan,  and  of  safeguard- 
ing the  security  of  Australia. 

In  view  of  these  divergent  points  of  view,  what  is  the  composite  policy 
of  the  British  Empire  in  the  Far  East? 

It  should  be  understood  as  an  axiom  that  the  British  Empire,  by  the 
very  nature  of  its  composition,  can  admit  of  no  argument  based  on  the 
color  division  between  East  and  West.  The  British  Empire  is  a  "pie- 
bald" empire.  Mr.  Srinivasa  Sastri,  for  instance,  will  attend  the  Was'h- 
ington  Conference  as  the  represenftative  of  the  Indian  section  of  the 
British  Empire  delegation.  The  Empire  is  a  bridge  between  East  and 
West.  It  may  be  wrong  for  it  to  be  so ;  but  it  is  so.  For  a  hundred 
years  the  British  Empire  has  aimed  at  the  elimination  of  race-war  and 
race-discrimination,  and  at  the  fostering  of  race-understanding.  The 
opinion  is  moreover  strongly  held  here,  both  in  government  circles  and 
generally  in  the  country,  that  the  whole  peace  in  the  Pacific  is  depen- 
dent on  such  an  understanding  between  the  white  and  the  yellow  races. 
Mr.  I.loyd  George  has  lately  said  that  there  could  be  no  greater  calamity 
for  the  world  than  a  further  aggravation  of  race-hostility;  that  the 
British  Eimpire  has  in  the  past  done  much  towards  ismoothing  out  such 
hostility,  a  fact  which  is  attested  by  the  loyalty  of  Asiatic  peoples  to 
the  British  King;  and  that  to  abandon  such  a  policy  now  would  not  only 
increase  the  danger  of  war,  but  would  divide  the  Empire  against  itself. 

3.      rut  INTEREST   01^   CHINA 

It  is  true  that  Great  Britain  has  to  face,  and  is  prepared  to  face,  the 
question  of  China.  There  will  be  no  difficulty  in  arriving  at  an  agree- 
ment in  principle  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  fhat  the 
interests  of  China  must  be  protected  against  Japanese  designs,  or  against 
anybody  else's.  But  what  are  the  practical  steps  to  be  taken?  Is  the 
United  States  prepared  to  take  any  practical  measures,  military  or  other- 
wise, to  protect  China  against  Japan?  Probably  not.  What  then  can 
be  done?     Great  Britain  answers  that  the  instrument  is  ready  at  hand. 

[32] 


A  definite  understanding  with  Japan,  whether  in  the  form  of  an  alliance 
or  in  some  other  form,  carries  with  it  an  influence  on  the  conduct  of 
Japan.  A  square  deal  towards  China  on  the  part  of  Japan  can  be  made 
a  condition  of  the  advantages  which  Japan  enjoys  as  a  result  of  such 
an  alliance.  Great  Britain  at  this  moment  has  an  influence  over  Japan, 
and  therefore  a  practical  means  of  protecting  China,  which  the  United 
States  has  not.  British  opinion  'holds  that  there  can  be  no  hope  of  any 
kind  in  merely  saying  to  Japan  "You  are  a  dirty  yellow  dog"  (or  its 
diplomatic  equivalent)  and  doing  nothing  further.    Far  better  be  friends- 

4.      AN  ESCAPE  FROM   THE  BRITISH  DILEMMA 

When  the  British  Empire  Conference  found  itself  in  the  dilemma 
produced  by  the  issue  between  Canada  and  Australia,  Presidenit  Har- 
ding's invitation  to  Washington  came  as  a  deus  ex  machina.  A  gen- 
eral agreement  on  the  problem  of  the  Pacific,  to  which  the  United  States, 
Britain,  Japan  and  China  were  alike  parties,  would  have  the  happ) 
effect  of  satisfying  the  demands  of  the  British  Isles,  Canada  and  Aus- 
tralia alike. 

Let  me  anticipate  a  very  natural  American  objection  to  this  argument. 
Many  Americans  are  quite  frankly  irritated  by  it.  "Consider  (they 
say)  Japan's  action  in  Shantung;  Japan's  1915  ultimatum  to  China, 
with  its  21  points — 'every  one  of  them  a.  gaping  wound'; — why  talk 
of  a  general  understanding  with  such  a  background  as  this?  The  effect 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  is  on  the  one  hand  to  enable  Japan  to 
do  her  worst  in  the  Far  East  and  not  to  suffer  for  it,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  to  prevent  Great  Britain  from  taking  her  natural  place  side  by  side 
with  the  United  States  in  condemning  such  enormities." 

To  this  the  British  opinion  would  answer  that  she  yields  place  to  no 
one  in  her  stand  for  the  square  deal  and  for  fair  play.  It  is  what  she 
has  been  struggling  for  in  the  European  peace  settlement  since  1918, 
often  at  heavy  sacrifice  and  to  the  risk  of  former  friendships.  She 
would  gratefully  have  welcomed  American  help  in  many  a  recent  crisis 
produced  by  this  very  determination  to  secure  fair  play  all  round.  Let 
the  United  States  formulate  any  concrete  program  for  the  protection  of 
Chinese  interests;  Great  Britain  will  not  only  support  it,  but  will  prob- 
ably add  to  it,  if  that  were  possible.  But  by  the  same  token.  Great 
Britain  will  not  consent  to  any  violation  of  the  square  deal  as  it  af- 
fects Japan, 

5.      FAIR  PLAY  FOR  JAPAN 

How  then,  it  will  be  asked,  do  Japanese  interests  enter  into  the  ques- 
tion of  the  square  deal?     On  this  point  it  will  probably  bfe  found  at 

[33] 


Washington  that  the  British  will  urge  these  two  main  considerations : 
(i.)  Japan  took  an  honorable  and  valuable  part  in  the  war.  Her 
cruisers  escorted  Australian  troops  to  Europe.  But  for  Japan  Van- 
couver might  have  been  bombarded.  Quite  simply  and  quite  frankly 
Great  Britain  feels  that  it  is  not  playing  the  game  to  make  use  of 
Japan,  and  then  to  throw  her  over. 

(2.)  Japan  is  entitled  to  adequate  scope  for  her  reasonable  needs, 
no  less  than  the  other  Asiatic  peoples.  Look  at  the  map,  and  see 
how  much  of  the  littoral  has  been  appropriated  by  the  white  nations. 
Is  Japan  to  be  wholly  excluded?    The  Monroe  Doctrine  ha;5  two  edges. 

6.      MILITARY  DISARMAMENT 

There  are  powers,  such  as  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
which  are  naval  in  character.  There  are  others,  such  as  those  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe,  which  are  mainly  military.  If,  as  all  sections 
of  opinion  in  Great  Britain  devoutly  hope  will  be  the  case,  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  succeeds  in  reducing  naval  armaments,  will  the 
movement  end  there,  or  will  it  rather  be  extended  to  military  arma- 
ments? The  risk,  if  risk  there  be,  is  no  greater  in  one  case  than  in 
the  other;  the  advantages  are  equal.  It  is  at  least  arguable  that  the 
limitation  of  naval  armaments  is  conditioned  in  the  long  run  by  a  cor- 
responding limitation  of  military  armaments.  To  British  eyes  this  is 
especially  clear,  because  fate  has  made  us  a  European,  as  well  as  a 
Pacific,  power. 

What  France  Wants 

by  SiSLEY  Huddle STON 

ROBABLY  the  funniest  remark  that  has  ever  been  made  about 
France's  military  situation  is  that  of  a  French  delegate  to  the 
Assem"hry  of  the  unhappy  League  of  Nations.  Germany,  de- 
clared M,  Noblemaire,  has,  it  is  true,  disarmed  in  a  material  sense, 
but  then  she  has  not  disarmed  morally;  whereas  France,  though  materi- 
ally keeping  a  large  army,  has  long  ago  disarmed  morally.  I  do  not 
know  whether  Washington  will  applaud  ais  heartily  as  Geneva.  France, 
of  course,  has  a  case,  and  it  is,  from  a  certain  viewpoint,  an  excellent 
case.  But  it  is  obvious  that  if  one  begins  to  draw  distinctions  between 
what  is  material  and  what  is  moral  in  armament  and  disarmament,  it 
is  open  to  each  nation  to  pretend  that  its  material  forces  are  of  no  con- 
sequence since  morally  they  do  not  exist.  If  this  audacious  paradox  is 
admitted,  the  Washington  Conference  will  have  an  easy  task.  Japan 
wilL'be  able  to  assure  the  American  people  that  the  number  of  ships  is 

[34] 


totally  irrelevant,  since  they  have  been  morally  dismantled  by  Japan. 
The  ♦United  States  will  be  able  to  proclaim  that  the^naterial  figures  in 
the  budget  are  unimportant,  since  America  is  morally  not  going  to  in- 
crease her  fleet.  England  can  show  that  her  navy  is  purely  a  material  thing. 
It  is  unfortunately  to  be  feared  however  that  sceptics  will  not  be  satisfied. 
Nobody  can  deny  that  the  spirit  of  a  nation  means  more  than  the  size  of  its 
armed  forces,  but  one  can  judge  spirit  only  by  its  material  expression. 

For  France  the  Washington  Conference  really  resolves  itself  in  ad- 
vance into  a  discussion  of  land  forces.  It  is  true  that  France  has  pos- 
sessions in  the  Far  East  and  is  even  aittempting  some  kind  of  economic 
penetration  of  China — though  the  collapse  of  the  Banque  Industrielle 
de  Chine  dealt  a  sad  blow  to  her  credit  in  the  Far  East  and  was  an- 
nounced at  the  same  moment  that  Germany  resumed  her  banking  opera- 
tions in  China.  But  France  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  special  concern 
with  the  Sino-Japanese  quarrel.  Politically,  France  would  regard  the 
fate  of  Shantung  and  other  Chinese  provinces  with  comparative  indif- 
ference. I  am  afraid  that  conscience  has  not  yet  been  put  into  diplom- 
acy and  therefore  were  the  struggle  to  be  between  one  weak  and  dis- 
integrating yellow  people  and  another  strong  and  expanding  yellow 
people,  it  would  indeed  be  hard  to  raise  a  headline. 

But  France  begins  to  take  notice  of  Pacific  problems  for  various 
reasons.  In  the  finst  place,  it  is  a  matter  of  prestige:  she  must  take 
her  place  as  an  equal  among  the  great  powers  meeting  in  Washington. 
France  quite  rightly  has  been  somewhat  troubled  about  her  rank 
since  she  suspected  Great  Britain  of  assuming  a  sort  of  overlord- 
ship  of  the  Continent.  Such  symptoms  of  diplomatic  diminution 
as  the  relegation  of  the  French  language  to  the  second  place,  grieve 
her  greatly.  Again,  the  Pacific  problem  is  one  which  directly  aflfects 
her  friendjs.  It  affects  England  and  it  affects,  above  all,  America. 
Now  although  it  is  not  yet  clear  when  and  how  America  will  return 
politically  to  Europe,  France  has  not  lost  hope  of  American  aid  in  Eu- 
rope's restoration,  and  of  American  guarantees  against  German  ag- 
gression. I  will  not  dwell  upon  the  sentimental  ties  which  undoubtedly 
exist  between  the  two  great  Republics.  It  is  certainly  the  case  that 
France  has  never  reproached  America  for  her  disillusionment  ais  she 
has  reproached  England.  While  she  loses  no  opportunity  of  emitting 
malicious  little  articles  against  her  neighbor  across  the  Channel,  she 
never  ceases  to  laud  her  associate  across  the  Atlantic.  Apparently  a 
menage  a  trois  is  just  as  difficult  in  the  international  sphere  as  in  family 
life.  The  Matin  offers  a  remarkable  instance  of  how  propaganda  on 
behalf  of  America  is  understood  to  imply  hostility  towards  England. 
One  rejoices  to  isee  this  newspaper  strengthening  the  bonds  of  friend- 

[35] 


/' 


ship  between  France  and  America,  but  one  wonders  why  the  directors 
should  consider  that  a  necessary  corollary  is  Anglophobia.     Because  it 
believes  this,  the  Matin  is  rendering  not  good  but  pernicious  services 
to  humanity.    There  is  a  great  deal  of  propaganda  in  France  on  behalf 
of  America  and  a  great  deal  of  propaganda  in  America  on  behalf  of 
France.     All  kinds  of  aissociations  send  delegates  and  these   delegates 
are  loudly  and  conspicuously  feted.     Statesmen  and  generals  pay  visits, 
and  the  ceremonies   are  recorded  in  many  columns.     This  is   (except 
that  one  must  make  reservations  about  the  efficacy  of  official  propa- 
ganda) as  it  should  be;  but  it  is  inexplicable  why  there  should  go  hand 
in  hand   with  praise   of   America  abuse  of   England.      Psychologically, 
perhaps,  one  might  suggest  that  America  forfeited  France's  friendship 
much  less  in  withdrawing  completely  from  the  treaty  partnership,  than 
did  England  in  remaining  in  partnership  only  to  embarrass  French  action. 
However  this  may  be,  there  is  certainly  a  genuine  warmth  of  feeling 
for  America  in  France  as   there  is  in  America   for   France.     Political, 
calculation  plays  a  very  small  part  in  this,  and  not  much  notice  should 
be  given  to  indiscreet  remarks  in  such  papei-<s  as  the  Intransigeant,  sug- 
gesting that  France  should  take  advantage  of  the  delicate  situation  in 
which   Anglo-American   relations   stand   to   play   off   one   Anglo-Saxon 
nation  against  the  other.     Such  a  vague  unworthy  notion  could  in  any 
case  hardly  be  developed  precisely,  and  is  in  no  way  countenanced  by 
France's  responsible  politicians.     Obviously  France  must  be,  though  in- 
directly, keenly  intere^ited  in  any  measures  which  will  prevent  a  Pacific 
catastrophe.     She  could  not  look  on  without  emotion  and  watch  America 
drifting  into   a   war   with   Japan — a   war   which,   whatever   the   result, 
would  at   any   rate   divert  attention   from   European  needs   and   would 
destroy  all  chance  of  American  cooperation  with  Europe.     In  this  sense 
she  is  vitally  concerned  with  the  success  of  the  Washington  Confer- 
ence— and  that  success  depends  largely  on  Anglo-American  friendship, 
since  England  by  her  relations  with  Japan  possesses  a  controlling  influence. 
It  remains  true  that  for  France  the  chief  question  to  be  discussed  at 
^  Washington  is  not  a  naval  holiday  but  land  disarmament.    Any  proposal 
for  an  immediate  drastic  reduction  of  armies  touches  her  personally  and 
I    peculiarly.    This  i's  why,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  considered  essential  that 
she  should  send  to  Washington  her  most  authoritative  defenders.     This 
is  why  she  must  be  represented  by  men  with  winning  tongues,  capable 
of  explaining  her  policy  with  the  utmost  clarity.     Certainly  it  is  incon- 
venient, on  account  of  urgent  domestic  difficulties,  in  the  interplay  of 
opposing  Parliamentary   forceis,   for  her  principal  statesmen  to  remain 
long  absent.     But  they  must  'be  spared   for  a  time  sufficiently  long  to 
enable  them  to  deliver  from  the  platform  of  Washington  a  speech  or 

[36] 


speeches  which  will  show  that  French  vigilance  is  justified.  But  this 
is  why,  on  the  other  hand,  a  certain  section  of  French  opinion  deprecates 
the  risks  that  French  statesmen  will  run  of  being  asked  awkward  ques- 
tions. This  section  thought  it  better,  not  for  France  to  keep  out  of  the 
Conference — but  to  be  represented  by  less  showy   functionaries. 

I  have  recently  met  in  Europe  American  financiers  and  business  men 
who  have  visited  mo.yt  of  the  countries  of  Balkanized  Europe  which 
stand  in  need  of  long-term  credits.  Whatever  America  as  a  whole  may 
think  of  Europe  there  is  one  simple,  solid  thought  fixing  itself  firmly  ,  y 
in  the  minds  of  these  travelled  American  business  men  and  financiers,  jji^ 
They  see  that  bankruptcy  and  armaments  go  together.  They  are  aware 
of  the  multiplied  frictions  which  necessitate  the  maintenance  of  immense 
armies,  armies  greater  than  existed  in  pre-w^ar  days,  and  they  are  aware 
that  it  is  precisely  in  those  countries  which  cannot  buckle  their  budgets 
that  most  money  is  being  poured  down  the  sewer  of  armaments.  Un- 
animously they  demand,  as  a  preliminary  condition  of  confidence  and 
credits,  less  spending  on  armies,  an  attempt  to  reduce  the  annual  deficits, 
some  assurance  of  peace,  and  corresponding  political  stability.  The 
material  basis  of  credits,  the  material  justification  for  big  business,  big 
undertakings,  big  exploitation  of  concessions  which  would  be  readily 
granted,  is  not  wanting;  and  therefore  the  unemployment  problem  which 
is  so  devastating  in  America  could  be  largely  solved  in  Europe.  But 
what  is  lacking  is  precisely  a  European  peace  policy.  The  first  thing 
to  be  done  is  to  reduce  land  armies,  and  thus  relieve  budgets,  and  thus 
obtain  financial  and  political  security. 

That  is  the  problem  expressed  in  general  temis.  But  it  is  not  only 
Poland  and  Rumania  and  Hungary  and  Jugoslavia  which  make  Ameri- 
can financiers  pause,  and  which  furnish  arguments  to  those  who  oppose 
the  cancellation  of  war  debts.  France  herself  has  not  yet  fixed  her 
military  policy.  For  my  part  I  believe  that  France  as  a  nation,  as  a 
people,  is  entirely  pacific.  The  charge  that  she  is  desirous  of  embark- 
ing on  adventures,  that  she  has  imperialistic  ambitions,  is  not  well- 
founded.  What  troubles  her  is  that  she  is  still  in  peril.  She  does  not 
wish  to  attack  but  she  is  determined  to  defend. 

One  may  differ  totally  about  the  wisdom  of  her  methods:  one  may  / 
ask  whether  preoccupation  about  self-protection  does  not  sometimes 
singularly  resemble  defiance  and  distrust  that  are  bound  to  express  them- 
selves violently  beyond  the  borders  of  France.  But  the  group  of  poli- 
ticians who  would  dislocate  Germany,  who  would  disannex  (but  not 
annex)  the  Rhineland  from  the  Reich,  is  small  if  noisy,  and  cannot  in 
my  opinion  do  otherwise  than  decline  in  importance.  There  are,  of 
course,  militarists  in   all   countries  and   France   does  not  constitute  an 

[37] 


exception.  Everything  however  points  to  the  eventual  adoption  of  a 
specific  policy  of  pacification  if  France  is  not  made  to  feel  herself  in 
a  dangerous  solitude,  if  she  is  made  to  feel  that  she  has  friends. 

Still,  France  has  not  yet  decided  what  shall  be  the  future  duration 
of  compulsory  universal  military  service.  She  has  three-quarters  of  a 
million  men  under  arms,  and  Mr.  Albert  Sarraut  the  other  day  inti- 
mated that  the  period  of  service  could  only  be  finally  reduced  when  a 
native  army  of  300,000  men  had  been  raised.  At  the  same  time  M. 
Balkanowski,  the  reporter  for  the  Finance  Commission  of  the  Chamber, 
is  calling  attention  to  the  prodigious  sums  (18  milliard  francs)  which  will 
have  a  few  years  hence  to  be  disbursed  annually  for  the  service  of  the 
public  debt — sums  which  sensibly  approach  what  has  hitherto  been  re- 
garded as  the  limit  of  state  revenue  from  taxation.  It  is  certainly  not 
my  purpose  to  criticize  France,  but  these  facts  have  been  freely  cabled. 
They  are  notorious  and  require  explanation. 

Now  the  explanation  which  France  will  furnish  at  Washington  is  ex- 
ceedingly simple.  It  is  that  it  would  be  folly  to  disarm  until  it  is  seen 
clearly  what  is  to  be  the  political  configuration  of  Germany.  It  would  be 
folly  to  invite  the  revanche  of  the  hereditary  enemy.  It  would  be  folly 
to  surrender  the  means  of  pressure  upon  her  recalcitrant  neighbor  until 
it  is  certain  that  Germany  will  make  such  reparation  as  is  possible.  She 
cannot  throw  away  lightly  the  only  weapon  which  she  possesses,  any 
more  than  America  can  scrap  her  navy  until  she  is  assured  that  there 
will  be  no  sanguinary  quarrel  with  Japan.  To  ask  her  to  do  so  in  present 
circumstances  is,  she  believes,  unreasonable. 

The  circumstances  which  are  of  chief  importance  are  these:  Germany 
is  still  swayed  by  contrary  impulses,  still  hesitates  between  pacific  repub- 
licanism and  militaristic  monarchism;  France  agreed  to  the  limited  oc- 
cupation of  the  Rhineland  on  condition  that  there  was  a  tripartite  mili- 
tary pact  between  herself,  England  and  America — a  pact  which  fell 
through  because  of  its  non- ratification  by  America,  leaving  France  without 
either  her  natural  frontiers  on  the  Rhine  or  the  assurance  of  Allied  help 
against  subsequent  aggression ;  while  the  League  of  Nations  as  constituted 
is  without  effective  power  and  is  unable  to  control  events  in  Europe. 

Certainly  the  policy  of  so-called  security  is  sterile.  But  in  view  of 
^/.  Mhe  desertion  of  France  by  her  former  Allies,  how  can  she  forget  that 
her  future  safety  depends,  as  she  argues,  on  her  possession  of  force? 
The  Temps  in  an  admirably  balanced  article  has  just  deplored  France's 
isolation.  The  incidents  in  Italy,  where  a  French  Mission,  headed  by 
a  French  Marshal,  was  hooted  and  molested,  emphasize  the  inevitable 
break-up  of  the  coalition  of  war.  I  have,  I  think,  sufficiently  pointed 
out   France's   diplomatic   aberrations   to   be   allowed   to   draw   attention 

[38] 


to  the  responsibility  incurred  by  her  former  associates  in  leaving  her  in 
the  lurch,  without  any  assurance  of  solidarity  should  voluntary  disar- 
mament make  her  again  a  victim.  .  , 

Of  the  serious  consequences  to  France  of  this  necessity,  real  or  im-li 
aginary,  of  maintaining  large  armies,  there  is  no  need  to  say  much.  It 
is  obvious  that  France  cannot  afford  her  army.  Overburdened  as  she 
is,  the  direct  cost  is  crushing.  The  indirect  cost  is  colossal.  Germany 
has  an  immense  economic  advantage  over  France  inasmuch  as  she  has 
few  soldiers;  that  is  to  say,  few  idlers.  Not  only  are  these  young 
Frenchmen  non-productive  during  the  period  of  service,  but  they  are 
demorahzed  in  barracks.  Just  as  the  Frenchman  reaches  the  threshold 
of  manhood,  just  as  he  is  finishing  his  studies  or  is  about  to  become  a 
proficient  worlcman,  he  is  compelled  to  leave  all,  to  forget  all,  to  waste 
his  days  in  the  useless  occupations  of  soldiering.  The  effect  on  his 
after-life  in  many  cases  is  ruinous.  Not  until  the  system  of  compulsory 
universal  military  service  is  abandoned,  can  France  make  the  most  of 
her  intellectual  and  industrial  potentialities. 

It  would  indeed  be  strange  were  Frenchmen  not  to  see  these  things. 
They  do  see  them.  They  only  support  them  because  there  seems  to  be 
no  other  way.  Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  Washington  will  point  out 
the  better  way?  America  has  a  great  moral  responsibility  for  Europe. 
She  is  truly  her  brother's  keeper.  Even  though  no  definite  solutions  of 
European  problems  are  reached  at  Washington,  at  least  the  doctrine  of 
solidarity — economic,  financial  and  military — should  be  preached  from 
the  Washington  platform,  and  a  new  conception  of  Americo-European 
relations  take  shape. 

A  Japanese  Rebuttal 

by  Bruce  Bliven 

IT  is  undeniably  true  that  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  is  in  gen- 
eral hostile  to  and  suspicious  of  Japan.  The  three  outstanding  rea- 
sons for  this  are  the  California  exclusion  question,  the  action  of  part 
of  our  press  in  urging  that  war  with  Japan  is  inevitable,  and  most  of  all 
the  widespread  belief  that  Japan  is  playing  the  role  of  villain  in  the 
Far  East,  having  conquered  Korea  by  the  sword,  overrun  Manchuria, 
and  pursued  in  China  a  course  of  economic  penetration,  disruptive  po- 
litical intrigue  and  seizure  of  territory  and  concessions  altogether  in- 
comptible  with  American  ideals. 

Whether  our  animosity  is  well  founded,  or  not,  it  is  discouraging  to 
those  who  hope  that  genuine  accomplishment  may  grow  out  of  the 
Washington   Conference.     To   a  peculiar  degree  this   gathering  is  the 

[39] 


result  of  the  pressure  of  public  opinion.  Inspired  at  least  in  part  by 
the  demand  of  the  taxpayer  for  relief  it  will  be  influenced  largely  by 
popular  sentiment.  If  the  American  public  dislikes  and  mistrusts  Japan, 
and  vice  versa,  the  problems  of  the  Conference  are  made  more  difficult. 
In  this  juncture  it  seems  no  more  than  fair  that  Japan's  point  of 
view  should  at  least  be  stated,  impartially  and  fully.  I  have  therefore 
obtained  a  statement  of  what  he  considers  to  be  his  country's  attitude 
from  a  distinguished  Japanese  who  has  been  carefully  watching  the 
trend  of  public  opinion  in  both  countries.  The  thoughts  which  follow 
are  his,though  expressed  in  my  words.  Needless  to  say,  his  views  are 
reported  without  endorsement  either  by  the  Neiv  Republic  or  the  writer. 


All  the  chief  naval  powers  which  are  sending  their  representatives  to 
Washington  have  indicated  a  desire  for  the  limitation  of  naval  arma- 
ments. Such  limitation  should  therefore  not  be  difficult  of  accomplish- 
ment. The  burden  of  military  and  naval  expenditure  in  Japan  is  op- 
pressive. Every  truly  patriotic  element  in  the  nation  would  welcome  the 
opportunity  to  decrease  it.  Our  eagerness  for  this,  however,  must  not 
make  us  lose  touch  with  reality.  Throughout  recorded  history  nations 
which  have  neglected  national  defence  have  b'een  trampled  under  foot 
by  ruthless  foes.  If  Japan  abolishes  the  single  plan  which  has  succeeded 
in  the  past,  this  can  only  be  done  if  her  national  safety  is  guaranteed  in 
some  other  way.  The  hope  or  the  confident  expectation  of  safety  is 
not  enough.     Regarding  her  position  there  must  be  no  doubt. 

American  hostility  to  Japan  is  based  on  a  complete  misapprehension 
of  Japanese  policy  toward  China.  The  presumption  is  that  Japan  wants 
a  clear  field  in  order  to  carry  out  unhampered  a  process  of  spoliation. 
Both  ideas  are  wrong.  Japan  does  not  wish  to  wreck  China.  She  wishes 
to  see  China  active  and  prosperous  and  above  all  energetic  in  the  develop- 
ment of  her  natural  resources.  In  an  economic  sense  Japan  has  become 
an  occidental  nation.  She  lives  today  upon  her  manufactures.  She  must 
get  raw  materials  from  China,  her  best  and  nearest  source.  She  must 
sell  her  manufactures  in  China,  her  best  and  nearest  market.  Like 
England,  Japan  must  export  goods  and  import  foodstuflfs  or  she  will  die. 

The  development  of  China  is  therefore  a  paramount  necessity  to 
Japan.  But  China  is  so  big  that  it  is  folly  to  expect  Japan  to  direct 
this  development  alone.  The  aid  and  cooperation  of  all  the  leading 
powers  are  necessary,  and  will  be  welcomed  by  Japan.  If  the  open  door 
policy  is  to  mean  a  real  open  door,  and  not  an  attempt  to  shut  Japan  out 
and  let  other  nations  in,  she  will  gladly  continue  to  endorse  that  policy. 

It  is  true  that  the  Japanese  have  done  many  things  in  China  which  are 
deplorable.     But  it  is  not  fair  to  judge  a  nation  by  the  acts  of  a  few 

[40] 


representatives  even  though  some  of  these  are  government  officials. 
There  are  scoundrels  in  all  nations,  but  the  majority  of  men  everywhere 
are  decent.  Japanese  officials  and  business  men  have  been  under  a 
peculiar  temptation  to  intrigue  in  China  because  there  are  so  many 
warring  factions  in  that  country  and  because  the  personal  character  of 
many  Chinese  officials  readily  breaks  down  under  temptation.  These 
are  regrettable  facts,  but  nothing  is  to  be  gained  by  demanding  with 
indignation  from  the  Japanese  a  moral  standard  never  yet  attained  in 
practice  by  any  nation. 

Moreover,  the  amount  of  Japanese  intrigue  in  China,  and  its  depravity, 
have  been  exaggerated  for  American  ears.  Some  of  the  evil  practices 
have  been  ended  by  the  Japanese  government.  There  was  undoubtedly 
smuggling  of  opium  and  morphine.  It  was  a  scandal,  but  an  international 
one,  since  British  and  American  business  men  participated  in  it.  Japan 
has  now  done  everything  in  her  power  to  end  the  illicit  trade. 

The  case  of  Korea  is  another  count  held  by  America  against  Japan. 
It  is  true  that  the  Japanese  military  authorities  have  been  guilty  of  some 
brutal  acts  toward  the  Koreans.  Do  you  recall  any  military  occupation 
not  marked  by  similar  incidents?  Korea  is  now,  and  must  be  a  part  of  the 
Japanese  Empire.  For  her  territory  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  an  un- 
friendly power  would  be  as  intolerable  for  Japan  as  a  similar  seizure  of 
Ireland  by  a  hostile  nation  would  be  for  Great  Britain,  This  is  a 
foundation  stone  of  Japanese  policy,  and  the  key  to  her  action  in  Man- 
churia. Korea  had  to  be-  defended  against  the  aggression  of  Russia  or 
China,  both  of  whom  Japan  has  fought,  and  defeated,  over  this  issue. 

Americans  cannot  seem  to  remember  that  the  history  of  the  Far  East 
for  the  past  forty  years  has  been  a  record  of  conquest,  of  the  forcible 
seizure  of  territory  and  economic  privilege,  in  which  all  the  leading 
powers  except  the  United  States  have  taken  part.  Japan  has  been  no 
more  and  no  less  guilty  than  every  other  nation.  These  actions  may  not 
agree  with  the  morality  of  Utopia,  but  they  have  been  the  invariable 
practice  of  all  countries  throughout  history.  These  policies  should  be 
overthrown;  but  they  are  too  deeply  rooted  for  this  to  be  done  in  a  day. 
John  Hay  recognized  this.  When  he  first  enunciated  the  open  door  policy 
he  specifically  declared  that  the  vested  rights  of  other  nations  in  the 
Far  East  should  be  respected.  Of  such  character  were  the  German 
rights  in  Shantung,  which  were  taken  over  by  Japan  in  due  and  legal 
form,  an  action  approved  by  France  and  Great  Britain  and  confirmed 
by  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  Japan  said  then,  and  has  never  wavered 
in  her  declaration,  that  the  territory  of  Kiaochau,  as  distinct  from  the 
economic  concessions  which  the  Germans  possessed,  would  and  will  be 
returned  to  China.     The  recent  proposals  of  Japan  for  the  transfer  of 

[41] 


Kiaochau  and  the  settlement  of  Shantung  are  proof  of  her  sincerity. 

Enemies  of  Japan  declare  she  is  bent  on  a  policy  of  "Asia  for  the 
Asiatics,"  that  she  would  be  glad  to  see  a  warfare  between  the  white 
race  and  a  combination  of  the  yellow  and  brown.  The  supposition  is 
not  only  false  but  nonsensical.  Such  a  conflict  is  an  impossibihty.  Look 
at  Asia  today :  India  is  in  the  hands  of  the  British.  The  French  control 
Indo-^China.  The  United  States  holds  the  Phihppines.  Siberia  is  Rus- 
sian. Part  of  China  is  controlled  by  the  various  western  powers.  To 
secure  the  cooperation  of  the  yellow  and  brown  races  would  require 
half  a  century  of  intrigue.  In  a  military  sense  such  an  aggression  would 
be  doomed  to  failure  from  the  start.  Suppose  India,  for  instance,  broke 
away  from  British  control.  The  result  would  be  chaos  tomorrow,  and 
that  is  the  last  thing  Japan  wants  in  any  quarter  of  the  world.  Her 
industrialized  state  can  only  survive  if  the  civilization  of  Asia  is  in- 
creasingly well  ordered  and  productive  in  an  economic  sense.  It  is  true 
that  the  Japanese  have  seen  the  march  of  the  white  man  around  the 
globe.  They  have  watched  him  come  to  the  eastern  shores  of  North 
America,  drive  out  the  Indians,  and  advance  to  the  Pacific.  They  have 
seen  Alaska,  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines  taken.  In  the  other  direction 
they  have  seen  Europeans  move  into  Africa,  Asia  Minor,  India,  Austraha 
and  the  islands  of  the  South  Seas.  Japan  could  hardly  be  blamed  if  she 
felt  that  only  the  accident  of  her  rapid  adaptation  to  occidental  standards, 
including  military  power,  has  preserved  her  independence.  However, 
Japan  does  not  fear  the  white  race  per  se.  3he  fears  any  force  which 
threatens  to  cut  off  her  access  by  the  sea  to  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials. 
And  she  feels  the  absolute  necessity  of  finding  an  outlet  on  the  continent 
of  Asia  for  her  increasing  population,  which  has  already  outn.m  the 
economic  resources  of  her  islands. 

As  for  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  the  feeling  of 
Nippon  toward  it  is :  Why  not  ?  It  has  been  in  existence  over  a  period 
of  years  and  has  apparently  caused  no  trouble  to  anyone — except  Ger- 
many, who  found  it  extremely  annoying  during  the  war.  The  alHance 
could  not,  under  any  group  of  circumstances  which  comes  within  the 
realm  of  possibility,  be  a  menace  to  the  United  States.  There  is  a  clause 
which  exempts  Great  Britain  from  the  necessity  of  standing  with  Japan 
in  a  war  against  America.  That  the  conditions  would  be  reversed,  that 
England  would  make  war  on  the  United  States  and  demand  Japan's 
assistance,  is  unthinkable.  Why  then  does  America  object?  One  inter- 
pretation is  that  the  American  people,  who  wrongly  think  that  Japan 
alone  among  the  nations  is  engaged  in  an  orgy  of  criminality,  believe  that 
if  England  signs  the  alliance  again,  she  underwrites  and  condones  Japan's 
acts.     Both  the  premise  and  the  inference  are  wrong. 

[42] 


Australia,  which  is  close  to  the  scene  and  in  a  position  to  judge,  has 
endorsed  the  proposal  that  the  alliance  be  renewed.  For  that  matter, 
she  has  good  reason  to  do  so,  since  the  agreement  saves  her  the  cost  of 
building  a  fleet  of  battleships  of  her  own.  Canada,  it  is  true,  opposes 
the  alliance;  but  Canadian  policy  is  predicated  upon  the  desire  to  main- 
tain harmonious  relations  with  her  big  neighbor  in  the  south. 

The  real  reason  for  Aimerican  dislike  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
is  probably  the  naval  situation  created  by  it.  In  spite  of  the  clause  in  the 
alliance  to  prevent  a  combination  against  America,  the  United  States 
views  with  apprehension  the  possibilities  of  a  combined  navy.  Japan's 
answer  to  such  fear  is:  if  you  don't  like  the  alliance  as  it  stands,  come 
in  yourselves  and  make  it  a  tripartite  agreement.  Write  the  terms  of  it 
as  you  will;  Japan  and  Great  Britain  will  probably  not  hesitate  to  agree 
to  them.  With  these  three  powers  in  harmony  and  working  on  a  fixed 
plan  in  the  Far  East,  Japan  would  gladly  consent  to  any  degree  of  dis- 
armament that  seemed  feasible.  Under  such  a  three-fold  alliance,  she 
would  yield  to  majority  sentiment  on  practically  any  phase  of  her  con- 
tinental policy.  The  only  exception  would  be  in  regard  to  the  economic 
concessions  Japan  now  enjoys,  which  she  believes  vital  to  her  existence. 

A  three-power  alliance  of  this  sort  would  be  able  to  solve  nearly  all 
the  difficulties  of  the  Chinese  problem.  There  seems  to  be  a  fundamental 
weakness  and  instability  in  the  character  of  Chinese  public  men,  which 
makes  their  policy  far  different  from  that  which  would  be  followed  by 
an  occidental  under  the  same  circumstances.  China  should  have  asked 
Theodore  Roosevelt  to  come  and  serve  as  her  president.  In  three  or 
four  years  he  could  have  wrought  a  transformation  in  the  people,  who 
need  the  mental  and  spiritual  discipline  he  would  have  given  them.  The 
same  thing  might  be  accomphshed  today  by  Mr.  Root  or  Mr.  Hughes. 
It  is  because  the  Chinese  people  lack  discipline  of  this  sort  that  such 
chaos  and  disunion  as  we  witness  today  become  possible. 

The  problem  which  Japan  keeps  constantly  before  her  is:  The  re- 
sources of  China  must  be  developed  for  the  welfare  of  the  world.  How 
can  this  best  be  done?  She  would  be  willing  to  submit  to  the  collective 
judgment  of  the  powers  as  to  the  answer  to  this  question.  She  stands 
ready  to  go  as  far  as  the  nations  will  go  toward  disarmament  and  the 
giving  and  taking  of  guarantees  for  the  maintenance,  in  general,  of  the 
status  quo.  She  asks  only  the  same  degree  of  fairness  and  altruistic 
interest  in  the  common  good  which  the  other  powers,  and  America  in 
particular,  are  asking  of  her. 


Parts  of  this  argument  will  seem  specious  to  many  Americans.     The 
proposal  to  "freeze"  the  status  quo  appears  highly  impracticable,  in  the 

[43] 


light  of  history.  There  are  also  whole  volumes  to  'be  said  about  the 
morality  of  forcing  an  unwelcome  new  type  of  civilization  upon  the 
Chinese,  no  matter  how  beneficently  it  might  be  done.  However,  in 
undertaking  to  give  expression  to  the  viewpoint  of  a  Japanese  on  his 
country's  policies,  I  limited  my  function  to  reporter,  not  debater.  I  have 
no  doubt  that  plenty  of  persons  will  come  forward  to  reply. 

Private  Enterprise  and  Public  War 

by  Manley  O.  Hudson 

EVEN  the  munition  makers  do  not  want  war!  We  have  it  on 
high  authority.  "The  truth  is  that  no  one  realizes  as  clearly  as 
do  we  makers  of  war  necessities  the  grave  financial  dangers  of 
modern  conflicts."  Thus,  the  chairman  of  America's  oldest  munition 
firm  in  the  latest  number  of  The  Nation's  Business.  How  the  realization 
is  acted  upon,  what  the  makers  of  war  necessities  do  to  prevent  modern 
conflicts,  we  are  not  told. 

But  "truth"  and  the  perception  of  it  often  dififer.  In  this  instance  they 
seem  very  far  apart.  For  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  private  interests 
engaged  in  the  production  of  war  materials  are  continually  charged  with 
responsibility  for  armament  competitions  and  war  panics,  if  not  with 
responsibility  for  directly  inciting  armed  confllicts.  In  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  past  war,  it  was  commonly  believed  in  Allied  countries  that 
munition  makers  had  played  such  a  large  role  in  Germany's  affairs  as 
to  be  a  factor  in  precipitating  the  war  itself.  "Krupp"  became  almost 
a  household  b3'Word,  and  it  continues  so,  long  after  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles has  made  the  notorious  firm  forego  the  munition  business  altogether. 

The  existence  of  this  suspicion  is  in  itself  a  factor  in  the  problem  of 
armaments.  So  long  as  it  continues,  so  long  as  no  effort  is  made  to  dig 
out  its  roots,  the  full  measure  of  public  confidence  will  be  lacking  for 
any  program  of  "disarmament."  Distrust  of  the  interests  to  whom  public 
defence  means  private  gain  feeds  the  Frenchman's  "German  menace" 
and  the  American's  "Japanese  peril."  It  is  part  of  the  task  of  the 
Washington  Conference  to  ferret  out  the  reasons  for  such  distrust,  and 
to  seek  some  method  of  destroying  it. 

The  swollen  profits  made  by  the  larger  munition  firms  in  Europe — 
the  Deutsche  Waffen-  und  Munitions fab'rik  is  reported  to  have  paid 
thirty-two  percent  dividends  in  1912  and  1913 — are  not  wholly  re- 
sponsible for  the  denunciations  of  the  "armaments  ring"  and  the  "war 
trust."  vSatisfactory  evidence  of  the  activities  of  munition  firms  has 
never  been  available.     The  firms  themselves  do  not  publish  their  own 

[44] 


incriminations.  But  several  incidents  just  before  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  for  which  we  have  tangible  proof,  hav6  led  to  the  fear  that  if  all 
the  facts  could  be  known  it  would  be  found  that  many  munition  makers 
were  banded  together  before  the  war,  in  an  international  trust  operating 
in  various  secret  and  sinister  ways  to  increase  the  orders  for  arms  and 
ammunition.  A  report  on  some  of  these  incidents  was  prepared  during 
the  war  by  a  commission  of  the  Nederlandsche  Anti-Oorlog  Raad,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  a  neutral  military  leader.  General  de  Meester.* 

The  obvious  danger  in  the  manufacture  of  war  necessities  b'y  private 
enterprise,  that  in  order  to  further  their  business  some  interested  in- 
dividuals may  seek  to  corrupt  public  officials,  has  not  great  international 
significance.  But  disclosures  in  various  countries  before  the  war  in- 
dicated the  length  to  which  such  an  evil  may  go.  In  1913,  a 
sensation  was  produced  in  the  German  Reichstag  by  charges  as 
to  the  bribery  of  German  officials  by  the  Krupp  firm.  The  accused 
persons,  including  four  officers,  defended  on  the  ground  that  they 
thought  that  "Krupp's  and  the  State  were  one  and  the  same  thing," 
were  convicted  of  betraying  military  secrets  to  the  Krupp  agent.  In 
June  and  July,  1914,  a  Japanese  court-martial  convicted  a  number  of 
Japanese  military  and  naval  officers  of  accepting  bribes  from  the  English 
firm  of  Vickers,  Ltd.,  and  the  German  firm  of  Siemens-Schuckert.  The 
charges  and  findings  were  published  at  the  time  in  the  Japan  Weekly 
Chronicle  and  in  the  Japan  Weekly  ]\Iail.  It  was  revealed,  for  instance, 
that  in  connection  with  the  construction  of  a  single  battle  cruiser 
£110,000  had  been  paid  out  in  Japan  as  commission  money. 

Of  greater  international  significance  are  the  accusations  that  certain 
armament  firms  have  been  responsible  for  spreading  misinformation  for 
the  purpose  of  goading  governments  to  enlarge  their  military  establish- 
ments. The  so-called  "Mulliner  incident"  in  England  figured  in  a  number 
of  important  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons.  It  was  alleged  that  in 
framing  the  naval  budget  of  1909,  which  resulted  in  an  Anglo-German 
naval  crisis,  the  British  government  had  relied  on  false  information  as 
to  the  secret  acceleration  of  naval  preparations  at  the  Krupp  works  in 
Germany;  and  that  this  information  had  been  supplied  by  Mulliner, 
a  director  of  an  English  ammunition  firm  which  was  soliciting  govern- 
ment orders,  who  had  been  admitted  into  the  government's  innermost 
councils.  Similarly,  in  early  1914,  the  "PoutilofT  affair"  aroused  great 
excitement  in  the  French  press  and  increased  the  general  feeling  of  un- 
easiness in  France.  Rumors  became  current  in  Paris  that  a  controlling 
interest  in  the  Poutiloff  factories  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  acquired  by 

♦  This!  report  is  published  in  Rapports  de  I'Organisation  Centrale  Pour  Une  Paix 
Durable,   1916,   Vol.  II,  pp.   315-355. 

[45] 


Krupp  and  the  Deutsche  Bank.  French  agents  from  Creusot  were  said 
to  be  employed  at  the  Poutiloff  factories  in  manufacturing  artillery  for 
Russia  according  to  French  secret  designs,  which  would  thus  fall  into 
German  hands.  The  denial  of  the  rumor  by  Krupp  agents  and  b'y  the 
Russian  government  did  not  allay  its  effect  on  French  opinion,  nor  on 
the  French  military  program. 

The  danger  that  some  armament  firms  may  operate  in  different  coun- 
tries to  play  off  one  government  against  another  was  accentuated  by  the 
international  character  of  many  of  the  larger  firms  before  the  war. 
English  firms,  for  instance,  were  interested  in  munition  plants  and  armor 
factories  in  Austria-Hungary,  in  France,  in  Italy,  in  Russia,  in  Spain, 
and  even  in  South  America.  The  Harvey  United  Steel  Co.,  Ltd.,  formed 
in  1901  and  dissolved  in  1913,  had  extensive  holdings  in  the  armament 
firms  of  various  countries.  Many  Englishmen  were  astonished  shortly 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  when  it  came  out  in  evidence  before  an 
English  court  that  the  Krupp  firm  held  shares  in  English  companies  to 
the  value  of  £200,000.  The  result  of  this  "internationalism"  was  that 
during  the  days  of  keenest  naval  competition  between  England  and 
Germany,  the  English  firms  supplying  the  British  government  were  also 
interested  through  their  affiliations  in  supplying  Germany's  chief  allies, 
and  the  chief  producer  in  Germany  profited  not  only  from  Germiany's 
increases  but  also  from  England's  efforts  to  overcome  them ! 

Important  also,  though  perhaps  less  sinister,  is  the  influence  of  muni- 
tion makers  on  the  national  policy  of  their  own  governments.  The  course 
of  the  Bethelem  Steel  Corporation  in  191 5  and  1916,  in  conducting  a 
campaign  of  opposition  to  the  proposal  that  the  United  States  construct 
a  government  armor  plant  as  recommended  by  Secretaries  of  the  Navy 
since  the  days  of  Secretary  Herbert,  was  an  understandable  pursuit  of 
self-interest.  And  the  explanation  in  the  Corporation's  annual  report 
for  191 5  that  "on  a  matter  of  this  kind"  the  Corporation  "has  an  im- 
portant obligation  to  the  nation  of  which  it  is  a  citizen"  is  interesting  as 
a  contribution  to  our  national  store  of  humor! 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  pre-war  situation  should  have  led  to  general 
incriminations  against  munition  makers.  General  Smuts  has  given  a  clear 
statement  of  the  objections  to  uncontrolled  private  manufacture.  In  his 
celebrated  pamphlet  on  the  League  of  Nations    (1918),  he  says  that 

as  long  as  the  production  of  munitions  of  war  remains  a  private 
commercial  undertaking,  huge  vested  interests  grow  up  around  it 
which  influence  public  opinion  through  the  press  and  otherwise  in 
the  direction  of  war.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  influence  of  Krupps 
has  been  harmful  to  the  great  peace  interests  of  the  world,  and,  in  a 
less  degree,  the  same  could  probably  be  said  of  most  other  similar 

[46] 


undertakings.  The  very  success  of  that  sort  of  business  depends  on 
the  stimulation  of  the  war  atmosphere  among  the  peoples.  The 
press,  influenced  by  the  large  profits  and  advertising  enterprise  of 
the  armament  firms,  whip  up  public  opinion  on  every  imaginable 
occasion;  small  foreign  incidents  are  written  up  and  magnified  into 
grave  international  situations  affecting  the  pacific  relations  of  states; 
and  the  war  temperature  is  artificially  raised  and  kept  up. 

Perhaps  adequate  data  for  establishing  such  a  general  statement  beyond 
controversy  cannot  be  assembled.  But  the  incidents  of  which  evidence  is 
available  tend  to  produce  the  impression  that  many  more  exist  for  which 
proof  is  lacking. 

Whether  true  or  false,  such  allegations  are  widely  believed.  They 
constitute  a  part  of  that  general  stock  of  vague  impressions  upon  which 
voters  rely  and  by  which  governments  are  moved.  A  recent  report  of 
the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  on  Armaments  of  the  League  of 
Nations  recapitulates  the  current  allegations  as  follows : 

1.  That  armament  firms  have  been  active  in  fomenting  war-scares 
and  in  persuading  their  own  countries  to  adopt  war-like  policies 
and  to  increase  their  armaments. 

2.  That  armament  firms  have  attempted  to  bribe  government 
officials,  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

3.  That  armament  firms  have  disseminated  false  reports  concern- 
ing the  military  and  naval  programmes  of  various  countries,  in  order 
to  stimulate  armament  expenditure. 

4.  That  armament  firms  have  sought  to  influence  opinion  through 
the  control  of  newspapers  in  their  own  and  foreign  countries. 

5.  That  armament  firms  have  organized  international  armament 
rings  through  which  the  armament  race  has  been  accentuated  by 
playing  off  one  country  against  another. 

6.  That  armament  firms  have  organized  international  armament 
trusts  which  have  increased  the  price  of  armaments  sold  to  govern- 
ments. 

But  what  can  be  done?  How  can  the  evils,  or  the  possibilities  of  evils, 
be  prevented?    How  can  the  public  suspicion  be  destroyed? 

General  Smuts  proposed  "that  all  factories  for  the  manufacture  of 
direct  weapons  of  war  shall  be  nationalized  and  their  production  shall 
be  subject  to  the  inspection  of  officers  of  the  Council"  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  His  suggestion  led  to  the  consideration  of  the  subject  at  the 
Paris  Peace  Conference,  and  in  President  Wilson's  first  draft  of  the 
Covenant  a  provision  was  included  wholly  interdicting  the  manufacture 
of  munitions  of  war  "by  private  enterprise  or  for  private  profit." 

The  abolition  of  private  manufacture  would  clearly  bring  some  ad- 
vantages.    It  would  wipe  out  the  pocket  interest  of  private  individuals 

[47] 


in  armament  competition  and  thus  remove  their  temptation  to  encourage 
large  public  expenditure  for  motives  of  private  gain.  If  they  should  not 
become  less  frequent,  war  panics  would  certainly  become  less  profitable. 
The  loss  to  individuals  and  the  circumscribing  of  their  initiative,  if  exist- 
ing plants  were  taken  over  with  compensaton,  would  probably  be  viewed 
quite  lightly  in  a  country  where  a  large  brewery  industry  was  suddenly 
destroyed  without  compensation. 

But  objections  come  first  from  the  smaller  states  which  are  not  able 
to  supply  their  own  munitions.    General  Smuts  thought  that 

to  keep  up  the  high  temperature  of  the  war  atmosphere  all  over  the 
world  for  the  sake  of  indulging  the  small  Balkan  and  other  states 
in  their  favorite  form  of  sport  will  not  appeal  to  the  great  demo- 
cracies of  the  world.  It  will  materially  assist  the  peace  policy  of  the 
Iveague  to  cut  ofif  the  supply  of  arms  and  munitions  from  these 
small  states,  whose  little  fits  of  temper  are  too  costly  to  the  world, 
and  whose  security  could  be  more  safely  entrusted  to  the  League. 

Coming  from  one  who  had  long  experience  in  conducting  war  on  behalf 
of  a  small  state,  his  view  must  be  considered.  But  does  it  cover  the  case? 
If  private  manufacture  were  forbidden,  each  state  which  maintains 
naval  or  military  forces  would  have  to  provide  itself  with  facilities  for 
the  manufacture  of  arms  and  munitions  by  state  enterprise.  In  time 
of  peace,  some  governments  might  purchase  from  other  governments, 
though  they  might  lack  assurance  of  continued  supply  and  they  might 
find  themselves  called  upon  to  accommodate  their  policy  to  the  views  of 
the  supplying  governments.  But  in  time  of  war,  a  belligerent  would  be 
unable  to  get  supplies  from  foreign  governments  unless  they  should  join 
it  as  co-belligerents.  For  as  international  law  stands  today,  the  supply 
of  munitions  by  a  neutral  government  to  a  belligerent  would  constitute 
a  violation  of  neutrality.  A  belligerent  would  have  to  depend  upon  its 
own  production  and  that  of  its  allies.  It  could  import  the  raw  materials 
from  neutral  countries,  if  its  trade  routes  were  kept  open.  But  depend- 
ence on  such  imports  would  require  the  maintenance  of  plants  adapted  for 
or  susceptible  of  being  adapted  for  manufacturing  war  necessities  on 
perhaps  short  order.  If  this  were  impossible — to  a  small  agricultural 
country  like  Siam  it  would  be  very  expensive — or  if  sudden  attack  were 
feared,  it  would  be  necessary  for  a  belligerent  to  keep  on  hand  sufficient 
stores  for  sudden  emergencies.  The  result  might  be  that  all  states  main- 
taining naval  or  military  establishments  would  feel  themselves  under  the 
necessity  of  becoming  producers  of  arms  and  munitions.  The  number 
of  munition  plants  would  b'e  greatly  increased.  Large  stores  might  be 
accumulated.     And  some  small  states  might  become  wholly  dependent 

[48] 


on  larger  powers  for  protection,  unless  they  were  content  to  seek  security 
in  the  League  of  Nations. 

If  all  production  of  munitions  were  put  into  the  hands  of  governments, 
without  other  changes  in  international  law,  the  situation  in  time  of  war 
would  he  much  the  same  as  if  neutral  individuals  were  forbidden  to  ship 
munitions  to  belligerent  governments.  When  Austria-Hungary  protested 
in  1915  against  the  shipment  of  arms  to  the  Allies  from  America, 
Secretary  Lansing's  reply  stated  that 

The  general  adoption  by  the  nations  of  the  world  of  the  theory 
that  neutral  powers  ought  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  arms  and  am- 
munition to  belligerens  would  compel  every  nation  to  have  in 
readiness  at  all  times  sufficient  munitions  of  v/ar  to  meet  any 
emergency  which  might  arise  and  to  erect  and  maintain  establish- 
ments for  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition  sufficient  to 
supply  the  needs  of  its  military  and  naval  forces  throughout  the 
progress  of  a  war.  Manifestly  the  application  of  this  theory  would 
result  in  every  nation  becoming  an  armed  camp. 

It  was  for  these  reasons  that  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  did  not  at- 
tempt to  abolish  private  manufacture  forthwith.  But  in  its  final  form 
the  Covenant  recognizes  that  some  action  is  necessary : 

The  ]\'Iembers  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture  by  private 
enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war  is  open  to  grave 
objections.  The  Council  shall  advise  how  tlie  evil  effects  attendant 
upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to 
the  necessities  of  those  Members  of  the  League  which  are  not  able 
to  manufacture  the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for 
their  safety. 

How  can  these  "grave  objections"  be  met?  Short  of  abolishing  private 
manufacture,  is  it  possible  to  control  it  so  as  to  prevent  its  "evil  effects?" 

Most  of  all,  publicity  is  needed — publicity  as  to  the  production  and 
distribution  of  arms  and  ammunition  throughout  the  world.  The  exist- 
ence of  armament  is  a  potential  danger  to  the  whole  world;  in  time  of 
peace  every  people  should  have  information  as  to  where  the  armament 
is  and  in  what  amount.  Secrecy  means  not  only  the  necessity  of  prepara- 
tion against  sudden  manoeuvres.  It  makes  possible  the  excited  fears 
of  which  panics  are  made.  It  creates  an  atmosphere  in  which  false 
rumors  are  readily  believed.  So  long  as  governments  may  conceal  the 
sources  of  their  munitions,  their  rivals  will  feel  insecure.  The  reports 
current  in  France  as  to  Germany's  secret  manufacture  of  arms  have  had 
a  big  influence  on  European  politics  during  these  past  two  years. 

The  measures  by  which  necessary  publicity  is  to  be  achieved  are  not 
simple  to  devise.    They  may  be  even  more  difficult  to  execute.    The  report 

[49] 


of  the  League  of  Nations  Commission,  already  referred  to,  makes  some 
interesting  suggestions  as  to  possibilities  to  be  studied.  These  include 
the  possibility  of  requiring  government  license  for  the  manufacture,  im- 
port or  export  of  any  arms  or  munitions,  with  arrangements  for  each 
government's  reporting  periodically  to  some  international  bureau  on  all 
licenses  issued;  of  requiring  all  shares  in  companies  engaged  in  the 
munition  business  to  be  nominative,  transferable  only  by  public  record, 
and  non-transferable  to  aliens;  of  requiring  public  audits  of  the  books 
of  such  companies;  of  taking  measures  to  prevent  individuals  interested 
in  such  companies  from  owning  or  controlling  newspapers;  and  of  for- 
bidding the  issuance  of  patents  on  implements  of  war  to  non-nationals. 

Some  progress  has  already  been  made  toward  controlling  the  trade  in 
arms.  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Germany  and  Hungary  have  undertaken  in  the 
Treaties  of  Peace  to  prohibit  the  export  of  war  materials  altogether. 
Since  1912,  the  President  of  the  United  States  has  had  authority  to 
forbid  the  shipment  of  arms  or  munitions  to  any  American  country  where 
"conditions  of  domestic  violence  exist."  For  two  decades  the  United 
States  has  been  a  party  to  the  Brussels  act  which  is  aimed  against  the 
"boot-leggers"  who  created  such  a  scandal  b'y  selling  arms  to  the  natives 
in  certain  parts  of  Africa. 

But  though  the  Brussels  act  is  still  in  force,  it  has  long  been  out  of 
date.  At  the  Peace  Conference,  the  Arms  Traffic  Convention  of  St. 
Germain  was  drawn  to  supersede  it.  This  convention  goes  much  further 
than  to  prohibit  the  export  of  arms  and  munitions  to  prescribed  territories 
in  Africa  and  the  Near  East.  It  requires  the  signatories  to  prohibit 
all  export  of  arms  and  munitions  except  under  special  government  license, 
and  to  publish  annual  reports  concerning  licenses  granted  and  the 
quantities  and  destination  of  exports  permitted.  It  was  signed  by  twenty- 
three  states,  and  has  now  been  ratified  or  adhered  to  by  at  least  nine 
states.  But  the  larger  producing  states  have  only  signified  their  willing- 
ness to  ratify  the  Convention  when  it  is  ratified  by  the  United  States, 
and  in  Washington  it  has  not  yet  been  submitted  to  the  Senate. 

Although  it  is  a  distinct  step  forward,  the  Convention  of  St.  Germain 
was  not  framed  with  a  view  to  preventing  the  evils  of  private  manufac- 
ture. When  measures  to  the  latter  end  are  formulated,  a  single  con- 
vention might  be  drawn  to  forbid  all  shipments  of  arms  to  prohibited 
areas,  and  to  embody  measures  which  will  protect  the  world  against  the 
possible  evils  of  both  private  manufacture  and  the  traffic  in  arms. 

The  next  step  is  clear.  A  general  international  conference  must  study 
the  whole  problem  of  private  manufacture,  the  possibility  of  its  abolition 
and  the  possibility  of  its  control,  as  well  as  the  problems  of  the  traffic 
in  arms.    The  second  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  has  decided  in 

[50] 


favor  of  holding  such  a  conference  to  be  convened  by  the  Council  at 
the  earliest  possible  date,  and  to  which  all  members  of  the  League  and 
all  interested  states  not  members  of  the  League  are  to  be  invited. 

Can  the  Washington  Conference  undertake  this  task?  If  all  the  pro- 
ducing states  vi^ere  to  take  part  at  Washington,  the  question  might  very- 
well  'be  considered  there.  But  some  notable  producers  will  not  be  rep- 
resented— Czecho-Slovakia,  for  instance,  which  has  the  important  Skoda 
works.  Moreover,  some  states  whose  resources  would  easily  admit  of 
their  becoming  producers,  such  as  Rumania  will  not  be  represented.  It  is 
difficult  to  see  how  the  Conference  could  deal  with  the  subject  adequately. 

Yet  the  reduction  and  limitation  which  may  be  achieved  at  Washington 
will  need  the  full  confidence  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  if  they  are  to 
last.  For  this  reason  the  prevailing  attitude  toward  "war  trusts"  cannot 
be  ignored.  In  addition  to  the  problem  of  reducing  and  setting  limits  for 
the  future,  assurance  must  be  obtained  that  under  no  circumstances  will 
the  world  renew  that  armament  race  from  which  a  holiday  was  so  vainly 
sought  before  1914.  If  competition  is  allowed  to  continue  at  all  it  must 
be  brought  out  into  the  light  of  day.  Secrecy  must  cease  to  serve  as  seed 
for  suspicion  of  other  peoples  and  their  good  faith.  The  Washington 
Conference  should  recognize  the  necessity  of  dealing  with  the  possible 
evils  of  private  manufacture  and  the  traffic  in  arms.  It  should  go  further, 
and  plan  a  general  international  conference  at  which  both  subjects  can  be 
considered  and  an  adequate  convention  can  be  framed.  In  such  a  matter, 
the  country  which  is  least  dependent  on  private  enterprise  in  other 
countries  can  afford  to  take  the  lead. 

A  Baedeker  to  the  Conference 

by  Frank  J.  Taylor 

the;  BORAH   RESOLUTION 

THE  Borah  "naval  holiday"  resolution,  if  it  deserves  a  place 
among  the  milestones  to  Camp  Disarmament,  does  so  because 
it  was  the  first  brief  sign  to  catch  the  public's  eye.  The  admin- 
istration claims  its  intentions  antedated  the  Borah  idea,  but  the  adminis- 
tration was  weak  in  signs.  The  first  milestone  to  catch  the  public  eye 
was  the  Borah  resolution,  simple,  sans  Pacific  problems,  or  other  ac- 
coutrements, through  which  Congress  declared : 

The  President  is  authorized  and  requested  to  invite  the  Govern- 
ments of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  to  send  representatives  to  a  con- 
ference which  shall  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  promptly  enter- 

[51] 


ing  into  an  understanding  or  agreement  by  which  the  naval  pro- 
grams of  each  of  said  governments,  to  wit,  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain  and  Japan,  shall  be  substantially  reduced  annually  during 
the  next  five  years  to  such  an  extent  and  upon  such  terms  as  may 
be  agreed  upon,  which  understanding  and  agreement  is  to  be  re- 
ported to  the  respective  governments  for  approval. 
the;  statd  dspartmeint's  rijjoinder 
That  brief  reminder  from  Congress  to  the  President  focussed  attention 
upon  naval  disarmament.     It  was  followed  by  a  State  Department  an- 
nouncement that  "the  President,  in  view  of  the  farreaching  importance 
of  the  question  of  Hmitation  of  armament,  has  approached  with  informal 
but   definite  inquiries  the   group   of   powers   heretofore   known   as   the 
Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  that  is,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy  and  Japan,  to  ascertain  whether  it  would  be  agreeable  to  them  to 
take  part  in  a  conference  on  this  subject  to  be  held  in  Washington  at 
a  time  to  be  mutually  agreed  upon." 

If  the  proposal  is  found  to  be  acceptable,  formal  invitations  for 
such  a  conference  will  be  issued.     It  is  manifest  that  the  question 
of  limitation  of  armament  has  a  close  relation  to  the  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  problems,  and  the  President  has  suggested   that  the 
powers  especially  interested  in  these  problems  should  undertake  in 
connection   with   this  conference  the  consideration  of   all   matters 
bearing  upon  their  solution  with  a  view  to  reaching  a  common  under- 
standing with  respect  to  principles  and  policies  in  the  Far  East. 
This  has  been  communicated  to  the  powers  concerned  and  China  has 
also  been   invited   to  take  part  in   the   discussion   relating   to   Far 
Eastern  problems. 
Obviously,  that  milestone  greatly  enlarged  upon  the  mere  "naval  holi- 
day" idea.    As  a  competent  government  spokesman  amplified  this  formal 
statement,  "the  administration  looked  out  over  all  horizons  and  the  only 
international  situation  which  threatened  war  of  importance  in  the  next 
forty  years  was  that  in  the  Far  East.    We  resolved,  if  possible,  to  remove 
the  causes  of  friction  between  the  nations  out  there  on  the  Pacific."    The 
reaction  to  this  step  was  magnetic.    As  expressed  by  the  press  and  letters 
to  the  White  House,  the  public  looked  forward  to  successful  accomplish- 
ment at  Washington  of  everything  undertaken,  but  only  partially  done 
by  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Hague 
Tribunal.     This  was  one  of  the  curves  on  the  highway  to  Camp  Dis- 
armament, Avhich  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State  look  back 
upon  as  most  dangerous.     They  felt  and  still  feel  that  the  American 
nation  expected  too  much   from  the  Conference. 

TEXT   OF    IDENTICAL    INVITATION.S   TO   THE    POWERS 

A  month  after  the  calling  of  the  Conference  had  iDeen  officially  an- 
nounced,  informal   negotiations   had   brought   the   governments   of   the 

[52] 


United  States,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  France  and  Italy  to  general  agree- 
ment on  agenda,  purpose  of  the  meeting,  and  the  date  for  opening  the 
Conference  in  Washington,  Armistice  Day,  November  nth,  enabling  the 
President,  on  August  ii'th,  to  issue  the  formal  invitations.  The  texts, 
one  of  which  follows,  plainly  revealed  that  the  disarmament  idea  had 
grown  to  proportions  where,  despite  the  alarm  of  Senator  Borah  over 
the  enlargement  of  the  purpose  of  the  Conference,  the  President  and 
Secretary  Hughes  could  see  almost  limitless  possibilities  in  the  Confer- 
ence they  were  to  guide,  though,  as  the  invitation  said,  "the  question  of 
naval  armament  may  naturally  have  first  place."  The  text  of  the  in- 
vitations to  Great  Britain,  Japan,  France  and  Italy,  which  were  identical, 
follows : 

The  President  is  deeply  gratified  at  the  cordial  response  to  his 
suggestion  that  there  should  be  a  Conference  on  the  subject  of 
Limitation  of  Armaments,  in  connection  with  which  the  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  questions  should  also  be  discussed. 

Productive  labor  is  staggering  under  an  economic  burden  too 
heavy  to  be  borne  unless  the  present  vast  public  expenditures  are 
greatly  reduced.  It  is  idle  to  look  for  stability,  or  the  assurance  of 
social  justice,  or  the  security  of  peace,  while  wasteful  and  un- 
productive outlays  deprive  effort  of  its  just  reward  and  defeat  the 
reasonable  expectation  of  progress.  The  enormous  disbursements 
in  the  rivalries  of  armaments  manifestly  constitute  the  greater  part 
of  the  encumbrance  upon  enterprise  and  national  prosperity;  and 
avoidable  or  extravagant  expense  of  this  nature  is  not  only  without 
economic  justification,  but  is  a  constant  menace  to  the  peace  of  the 
world  raflierThan  an  assurance  of  its  preservation.  Yet  there  would 
seem  to  be  no  ground  to  expect  the  halting  of  these  increasing  out- 
lays unless  the  Powers  most  largely  concerned  find  a  satisfactory 
basis  for  an  agreement  to  effect  their  limitation.  The  time  is  be- 
lieved to  be  opportune  for  these  Powers  to  approach  this  subject 
directly  and  in  conference ;  and  while,  in  the  discussion  of  limitation 
of  armament,  the  question  of  naval  armament  may  naturally  have 
first  place,  it  has  been  thought  best  not  to  exclude  questions  pertain- 
ing to  other  armament  to  the  end  that  all  practicable  measures  of 
relief  may  have  appropriate  consideration.  It  may  also  be  found 
advisable  to  formulate  proposals  by  which  in  the  interest  of  humanity 
the  use  of  new  agencies  of  warfare  may  be  suitably  controlled. 

It  is,  however,  quite  clear  that  there  can  be  no  final  assurance 
of  the  peace  of  the  world  in  the  absence  of  the  desire  for  peace, 
and  the  prospect  of  reduced  armaments  is  not  a  hopeful  one  unless 
this  desire  finds  expression  in  a  practical  efTort  to  remove  causes  of 
misunderstanding  and  to  seek  ground  for  agreement  as  to  principles 
and  their  application.  It  is  the  earnest  wish  of  this  government  that 
through  an  interchange  of  views  with  the  facilities  afforded  by  the 
conference,  it  may  be  possible  to  find  a  solution  of  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  problems,   of  unquestioned   importance   at  this   time,   that 

[53] 


is,  such  commoii  understandings  with  respect  to  matters  whicli  have 
been  and  are  of  international  concern  as  may  serve  to  promote 
enduring  friendship  among  our  peoples. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  Government  to  attempt  to  define  the 
scope  of  the  discussion  in  relation  to  the  Pacific  and  Far  East,  b'ut 
rather  to  leave  this  to  be  the  subject  of  suggestions  to  be  exchanged 
before  the  meeting  of  the  Conference,  in  the  expectation  that  the 
spirit  of  friendship  and  a  cordial  appreciation  of  the  importance  of 
the  elemination  of  sources  of  controversy,  will  govern  the  final 
question. 

Accordingly,  in  pursuance  of  the  proposal  which  has  been  made, 
and  in  the  light  of  the  gracious  indication  of  its  acceptance,  the 
President  invites  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to  participate  in 
a  Conference  on  the  subject  of  Limitation  of  Armament,  in  con- 
nection with  which  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions  will  also  be 
discussed,  to  be  held  in  Washington  on  the  nth  day  of  November, 
1921. 

THE  INVITATION  TO  CHINA 

The  invitation  to  the  Chinese  government,  cabled  at  the  same  time, 
was  identical  except  that  the  second  paragraph,  alluding  to  disarmament, 
was  omitted  from  this  text,  and  the  closing  paragraph  invited  the  Re- 
public of  China  to  participate  only  in  the  discussion  of  the  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  questions. 

ACCEPTANCES  RECEIVED 

France  was  the  first  to  accept  formally  the  American  invitation  with 
a  brief  note  communicated  to  the  American  Ambassador  in  Paris.  The 
Chinese  government  at  Peking  also  expressed  hearty  approval  with  the 
purpose  of  the  Conference,  commending  the  American  government  in 
that  efforts  to  limit  the  scope  of  the  parley  had  been  forestalled.  And 
finally,  Great  Britain's  reply,  forwarded  through  the  medium  of  Am- 
bassador Harvey,  expressed  the  hope  that  all  parties  would  approach 
the  Conference  in  a  spirit  of  courage,   friendliness  and  understanding. 

The  lengthy  reply  of  the  Japanese  Minister,  accepting  the  invitation 
to  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  Conference,  stressed  three  points;  first, 
satisfaction  that  the  United  States  had  taken  the  lead  for  reduction  of 
arms  burdens;  second,  Japan's  eagerness  to  remove  causes  of  inter- 
national misunderstandings;  and  third,  Japanese  vital  interests  in  the 
aflfairs  of  the  Far  East. 

The  Italian,  the  last  one  to  come,  for  unexplained  reasons  was  not 
made  public  by  the  State  Department.  Interest  by  this  time,  however, 
was  centred  in  a  new  series  of  communications,  the  requests  of  other 
powers  interested  in  the  Far  East  for  participation  in  the  conference. 

BELGIUM,    PORTUGAL   AND    HOLLAND    INVITED 

Belgium,  Portugal  and  Holland  were  successful.     In  identical  in  vita- 

[54] 


tions,  sent  on  October  4th,  they  were  invited  to  participate  in  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  on  Pacific  problems,  which  they  promptly  accepted. 
The  invitations  extended  them  read: 

The  invitation  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  the  Gov- 
ernments of  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Japan  to  send  rep- 
resentatives to  a  Conference  to  be  held  in  the  city  of  Washington  on 
November  nth,  1921,  on  the  subject  of  Limitation  of  Armaments, 
in  connection  with  which  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions  will  be 
also  discussed,  has  been  graciously  accepted.  The  Government  of 
China  has  also  been  pleased  to  accept  the  President's  invitation  to 
participate  in  the  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions. 

It  is  the  earnest  wish  of  this  Government  that  with  the  facilities 
afforded  by  a  Conference  it  may  be  possible  to  find  a  solution  of 
the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems,  by  a  pratical  effort  to  reach 
such  common  understandings  with  respect  to  matters  which  have 
been  and  are  of  international  concern  as  may  serve  to  promote 
enduring  friendship. 

In  view  of  the  interest  of  Belgium  in  the  Far  East,  the  President 
desires  to  invite  your  Excellency's  Government  to  participate  in  the 
•discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions  at  the  Conference, 
and  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  herewith  the  tentative  suggestions 
as  to  the  agenda  of  the  Conference,  relating  to  the  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  questions,  proposed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

OFFICIAI,  TEXT  OF  rnt  AGENDA 

In  the  meantime,  informal  discussion  of  agenda,  between  the  partici- 
pating governments,  had  been  making  some  headway,  and  on  September 
2 1st,  the  State  Department,  to  correct  impressions  created  by  press 
dispatches  from  abroad  on  what  purported  to  be  the  official  text  of  the 
agenda,  issued  the  following  outline  of  topics : 

Limitation  of  Armaments 
One :     Limitation  of  Naval  Armament,  under  which  shall  be  dis- 
cussed, (a)  Basis  of  limitation;    (b)  Extent;    (c)  Fulfillment. 
Two:     Rules  for  control  of  new  agencies  of  warfare. 
Three :     Limitation  of  land  armament. 

Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions : 

One:  Questions  relating  to  China:  first:  Principles  to  b'e  ap- 
plied; second:  AppHcation  of  Subjects;  (a)  Territorial  integrity; 
(b)  Administrative  integrity;  (c)  Open  door — equality  of  com- 
mercial and  industrial  opportunity;  (d)  Concessions,  monopolies 
or  preferential  economic  privileges;  (e)  Development  of  railways, 
including  plans  relating  to  Chinese  Eastern  Railway;  (f)  Preferen- 
tial railroad  rates;  (g)  Status  of  existing  commitments. 

Two:     Siberia   (similar  headings). 

Three:  Mandated  Islands  (unless  questions  earher  settled); 
Electrical  Communications  in  the  Pacific. 

[55] 


Under  the  heading-  "Status  of  Existing  Commitments"  it  is  ex- 
pected that  opportunity  will  be  afforded  to  consider  and  to  reach 
an  understanding  with  respect  to  unsettled  questions  involving  the 
nature  and  scope  of  commitments  under  which  claims  of  rights  may 
hereafter  fee  asserted. 

THE    MAKI'-UP    Oe   THE   DELEGATIONS 

Some  observers  feel  that  the  selection  of  the  various  delegations 
throws  more  light  upon  the  spirit  and  motives  behind  governments 
participating  in  the  Reduction  of  Arms  Conference  than  do  warm 
diplomatic  phrases.  This  being  true,  the  British  and  Japanese  personnel 
may  be  taken  as  good  omens  for  the  success  of  the  Conference.  They 
are  hailed  as  strong,  commendable  selections.  If  that  cannot  be  said  of 
the  American  delegiation,  it  can  at  least  be  accepted  that  the  Americans 
were  chosen  for  business,  t'he  business  of  carrying  through  the  United 
States  Senate  whatever  pact  is  the  outcome  of  the  Conference. 

At  least  one-half  of  the  delegation  was  chosen  for  that  purpose,  with 
the  shrewd  sanction  of  Secretary  Hughes,  who  enters  the  Conference 
in  the  difficult  role  of  combattant  simultaneously  of  two  different  groups 
of  opponents.  He  must  deal  cards  in  two  games  at  the  same  time,  as 
it  were,  the  more  important  one  with  alert  visiting  delegations,  and  the 
minor  but  more  difficult  contest  that  with  the  ever  suspicious  United 
States  Senate.  As  foreigners  see  our  delegation,  and  as  political  minded 
Americans  see  it,  that  is  the  outstanding  feature  of  its  position.  On  Mr. 
Hughes  and  his  cohorts  rests  the  major  responsibility  for  guiding  the 
Conference,  yet  they  may  not  assume  the  offensive  aggressively,  for  fear 
of  senatorial  repudiation.  The  most  they  can  say  of  Charles  E.  Hughes, 
chief  American  spokesman,  is  the  oft  heard  remark,  "They  will  pull  no 
wool  over  his  eyes."  The  least  to  be  said  is  that  his  precarious  political 
position,  with  relation  to  the  Senate,  will  oblige  him  to  permit  Premier 
Lloyd  George  to  assume  the  dominant  leadership  of  the  Conference. 

THE   BRITI.SH 

The  British  delegation  will  be  unique  among  others  at  the  Conference 
in  that  participants  in  each  session  will  be  chosen  from  the  panel  of 
eight  delegates,  four  from  England  and  four  from  the  colonies.  On 
many  questions  the  latter  group  is  expected  to  exercise  authority  quite 
independent  of  the  former.  Lloyd  George's  leading  colleague  from  Eng- 
land will  be  Arthur  J.  Balfour,  Lord  President  of  the  Council,  septuage- 
narian scholar,  author,  and  handy  man  at  public  affairs,  when  con- 
servatives are  in  demand.  However,  according  to  British  informants,  the 
"pinch  hitter"   for  Lloyd   George  at  the  Washington   Conference,   will 

[56] 


not  be  Balfour,  but  Sir  Auckland  Geddes,  British  Ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington, and  trusted  lieutenant  of  the  Prime  Minister.  Lord  Lee  of 
Fareham,  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  occupies  the  position  least  defi- 
nitely clear  of  any  of  the  delegates  of  Great  Britain. 

GREAT  Britain's  colonial  delegates 

Of  the  colonial  British  delegates,  Sir  Robert  Borden,  former  Prime 
Minister  of  Canada,  comes  nearer  than  any  other  to  personifying  the 
average  American  political  leader.  A  power  in  Canadian  politics  for 
years,  he  comes  to  Washington  leaving  an  election  in  his  wake.  That 
election  may  serve  as  the  first  opportunity  for  expression  of  popular 
sentiment  on  the  work  of  the  Conference  in  session  at  Washington. 
From  Australia  comes  Senator  George  F.  Pearce,  Australian  Minister 
of  Defense,  a  man  of  toil  who  has  worked  up  from  the  ranks  of  day 
labor,  sent  to  Wasihington,  it  is  said,  because  Prime  Minister  Hughes, 
his  chief,  after  long  absence  at  the  many  Paris  conferences,  must  repair 
political  fences.  The  same  is  true  of  Sir  J.  W.  Salmond,  New  Zealand 
Supreme  Court  Justice,  an  internationally  known  jurist,  but  in  Washing- 
ton as  spokesman  for  Prime  Minister  Massey.  V.  S.  Srinivasa  Sastri, 
member  of  the  Vice-Regal  Council  of  the  Government  of  India,  is  an 
enigma  poHtically,  even  to  British  observers,  who  recognize  in  him  so 
far  only  a  recognized  Plindoo  barrister  of  English  culture  and  training. 

THE   JAPANESE   DELEGATION 

Japan's  three  delegates,  Prince  lyesato  Tokugawa,  President  of  the 
House  of  Peers;  Vice-Admiral  Tomosaburo  Kato,  Minister  of  the 
Marine,  and  Baron  Kijuro  Shidehara,  Ambassador  to  Washington,  have 
equal  status  at  the  Conference,  their  government  is  careful  to  explain. 
However,  Prince  Tokugawa  is  looked  upon  as  their  dean,  if  not  chief. 
His  selection  is  regarded  in  Japan  as  a  stroke  of  diplomacy  for  Premier 
Hara.  Direct  successor  of  the  Shogunate  family,  in  feudal  Japan  the 
fighting  clan  of  Nippon,  Prince  Tokugawa  for  half  a  century  has  spurned 
political  appointments,  hearkening  to  fhe  advice  of  his  family  rather  than 
to  the  call  of  the  Emperor  to  poHtical  office.  A  wealthy  landowner,  he 
has  been  Japan's  leading  figure  for  benevolent  and  pacific  movements 
ever  since  his  graduation  from  Cambridge  University  in  England.  Though 
a  leading  liberal,  he  has  shunned  political  appointments,  until  prevailed 
upon  to  join  Japan's  delegation  to  Washington. 

Vice-Admiral  Kato,  though  affiliated  with  the  liberal  movement  in 
Japan,  represents  the  naval  point  of  view.  He  is  described  as  an  able 
statesman  by  Japanese  in  Washington.  His  influence  with  the  militarists 
in  Japan  is  great,  and  he  is  dependend  upon  to  "sell"  reduction  of  arma- 

[57] 


ment  to  the  militarists  of  his  country  if  this  Conference  is  successful, 
just  as  Senators  Lodge  and  Underwood  must  convince  their  senatorial 
colleagues  of  the  merits  of  the  pact  expected  to  grow  out  of  parleys  this 
winter.  The  Japanese  consider  Baron  Shidehara  an  independent  in 
politics,  their  diplomatic  appointments  being  independent  of  party. 
Ambassador  Shidehara,  a  comparatively  young  man,  under  fifty  years  of 
age,  is  credited  with  possessing  a  more  expert  knowledge  of  the  English 
language,  as  it  is  written,  than  any  other  foreign  diplomat  at  the  Amer- 
ican capital.  Previous  to  his  Washington  post  Baron  Shidehara  served 
as  minister  to  Belgium,  and  later  as  Under-Secretary  of  foreign  affairs. 

THE  FRENCH   DELEGATES 

Prime  Minister  Aristide  Briand,  who  is  also  French  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  will  head  the  delegation  for  France.  Extensive  accommo- 
dations at  the  Hotel  Willard  indicate  that  the  French  will  match  the 
British  and  Japanese  contingents  in  numbers  at  least.  M.  Briand,  long 
active  in  French  politics,  radical  spokesman  in  his  earlier  days,  still  a 
recognized  liberal,  would  be  expected  to  match  wits  with  Lloyd  George, 
as  occurs  at  Supreme  Council  parleys,  except  for  the  uncertainty  of  his 
position  at  home,  where  the  French  Prime  Minister  is  constantly 
menaced  by  leaders  of  a  more  militaristic  point  of  view.  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
second  of  the  French  delegation,  is  credited  by  his  people  with  having 
made  valuable  connections  with  American  political  leaders  in  the  course 
of  his  visit  to  the  United  States  earlier  this  year.  He  is  a  former  Prime 
Minister.  M.  Albert  Sarraut,  Minister  of  Colonies,  is  France's  leading 
spokesman  on  Far  Eastern  affairs  for  the  delegation,  while  M.  Jules 
Jusserand,  French  Am'bassador  to  Washington,  is  credited  with  knowing 
and  understanding  American  ideas  and  politics  better  than  any  other 
foreign  diplomatist  in  this  country.  M.  Philippe  Berthelot,  Secretary 
General  of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  will  serve  as  secretary  to  the  dele- 
gation. The  French  technical  staff  is  uncompleted,  as  this  is  written,  and 
perhaps  the  most  influental  of  the  French  advisers.  Marshal  Ferdinand 
Foch,  former  generalissimo  of  the  Allied  Armies,  will  serve  in  an  un- 
official capacity. 

THE   SPOKESMEN    FOR   ITAEY 

In  contrast  to  the  policies  of  Japan,  Great  Britain,  and  to  a  certain 
extent,  France,  where  success  of  the  Conference  is  gambled  upon  as  po- 
litical planks  with  which  to  bolster  up  existing  organizations,  Italy  has 
been  seeking  to  appoint  a  colorless  delegation  which  will  not  b'e  affected 
by  the  coming  elections,  that  is,  colorless  so  far  as  internal  politics  are 
concerned.  Officially  the  State  Department  had  not  been  notified  of  the 
selection  of  an  Italian  delegation,  when  this  unofficial  list  was  cited  as 

[58] 


the  probable  Italian  roll  at  Washington:  Signor  Carlo  Schanzer,  ex- 
minister  of  Finance,  chairman ;  Deputy  Filippo  Meclo,  leader  of  the  Cath- 
olic Party ;  Senator  Albertino,  editor  of  Corriere  de  la  Sera,  Milan's  pow- 
erful Socialist  daily,  and  Sr.  Rolandi-Ricci,  Ambasisador  to  Washington. 

china's  representatives 

The  probable  but  unofficial  list  of  Chinese  delegates  includes  Dr.  Al- 
fred Sze,  Minister  to  Washington — a  Cornell  graduate,  by  the  way,  well 
versed  in  American  habits  and  politics ;  Dr.  V.  K.  WelHngton  Koo,  Min- 
ister to  Great  Britain,  and  chief  of  the  Chinese  delegation  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference;  Wang  Chunghui,  Chief  Justice  of  the  Chinese  Su- 
preme Court,  and  C.  C.  Wu,  son  of  Wu  Ting-Fang,  former  minister  to 
the  United  States.  The  latter  delegate  is  expected  to  provide  the  liaison 
with  the  Canton  government,  if  the  latter  will  permit  Wu's  appointment 
to  the  delegation.  The  Peking  government's  reserv-ation  at  the  Cairo 
Hotel  in  Washington  is  sufficient  for  a  numerous  body  of  Chinese  offi- 
cials, once  China's  internal  strife  enables  the  government  in  power 
formally  to  name  its  delegation. 

THE  DELEGATES   FROM   BELGIUM,   HOLLAND  AND   PORTUGAL 

As  yet  the  delegations  of  the  lesser  powers,  Belgium,  Holland  and 
Portugal  have  b'een  but  unofficially  named.  They  are,  for  Belgium, 
Baron  de  Cartier  de  Marchienne,  Ambassador  to  Washington,  Felician 
Cattier,  prominent  Belgian  banker,  and  Jules  Jabot,  engineer,  long  with 
the  Belgian  Railways  of  China.  Holland's  prospective  delegation  in- 
cludes the  name  of  H.  A.  Van  Karnebeck,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Belaerts  van  Blokland,  Secretar}-  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  former  Min- 
ister to  China,  and  Dr.  E.  iMoresco,  Secretary  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Colonies,  and  former  vice-president  of  the  Dutch  East  Indian  Council. 
Portugal  semi-officially  announced  her  delegation  to  consist  of  Mello 
Barreto,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Ferreira  da  Rocha,  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  Augusto  de  Vasconcelor,  former  Prime  jNIinister. 

UNOFFICIAL   DELEGATES 

So  much  for  personnel.  If  the  barometer  of  success  for  achieving 
settlement  of  Pacific  problems  and  reducing  armaments  bears  any  rela- 
tion to  the  quality  of  "best  minds"  gathered  in  Washington  by  No- 
vember II,  prospects  are  good.  It  should  b'e  borne  in  mind,  also,  that 
the  "best  minds"  will  not  be  limited  to  invited  guests  to  Washington. 
Practically  every  nation,  small  or  large,  fro-m  Galicia  to  Korea,  will  be 
represented  in  Washington  by  delegates,  who  may  be  denied  the  floor 
of  the  Pan-American  Union  and  the  use  of  the  elaborate  press  accom- 
modation for  newspapermen  of  all  nationalities  in  the  Navy  Building 

[59] 


across  the  street  but  as  long  as  funds  last,  they  will  not  be  refused  the 
use  of  the  United  States  mails,  Washington  hotels,  and  in  all  probability 
the  forum  of  the  United  States  Senate,  where  no  question  is  too  large, 
too  remote,  or  too  complex  to  be  aired  by  some  Senator.  In  this  respect, 
Washington  is  rapidly  becoming  a  second  Paris,  but  unlike  Paris,  Wash- 
ington, blinking  in  the  spotlight,  as  centre  of  the  world  for  the  first 
time  in  history  hold  open  house  for  every  guest  who  can  pay  his  bills, 
be  he  invited  or  uninvited,  distinguished  or  disgruntled. 

Sea  Power  in  the  Pacific 

by  Stark  Young 

MR.  HECTOR  C.  BYWATER'S  contribution  to  the  study  of 
the  American-Japanese  Naval  Problem*  is  in  no  sense  a  war 
book.  To  a  remarkable  extent  the  effort  to  treat  both  sides 
impartially  seems  to  succeed,  with  the  weight  of  the  writer's  influence 
tending  toward  peace  rather  than  war.  The  book  deals  mainly  with  the 
naval  resources  of  the  two  powers  and  the  strategical  profblems  likely  to 
arise  in  the  event  of  a  war  for  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific.  The  chapters 
on  naval  matters,  however,  are  of  necessity  prefaced  by  a  brief  review 
of  the  principal  questions  at  issue  between  the  two  governments.  The 
first  chapter  amplifies  this  review  by  an  account  of  the  gravitation  of 
naval  power  from  West  to  East,  the  decline  of  the  British  navy  compared 
to  American  prospects,  the  arrival  of  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  in 
1919,  the  growing  prestige  of  the  Japanese  navy,  the  plans  of  the  British 
colonies  in  the  Far  East,  and  the  shifting  of  British  interests  since  the 
war  to  the  Pacific,  where  she  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  efforts  of  any 
foreign  power  to  establish  an  absolute  mastei"y. 

There  follows  an  adequate  treatment  of  the  questions  at  issue  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States:  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  in  1898;  the 
Philippines;  the  immigration  of  Japanese  into  America,  California 
especially;  and  the  spread  of  labor  agitation  and  unrest  in  Japan,  to  be 
relieved  by  aggressive  enterprises  abroad. 

The  two  chapters  on  the  United  States  navy  proceed  from  a  statement 
of  its  administration  to  the  material  resources.  There  are  twenty-eight 
dockyards  and  naval  ports  used  by  the  navy,  nineteen  of  which  are 
situated  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  the  Gulf  or  the  Cari'bbean  Sea,  and  the 
remaining  nine  on  the  western  Coast  or  in  the  Pacific.  Statistics  are 
given  to  show  that  the  opinions  prevailing  abroad  in  regard  to  the  sup- 
posed exorbitant  price  which  America  has  to  pay  for  her  measure  of 


*  Sea  Power  in  the  Pacific;  by  Hector  C.  Bywater.     Houghton  Mifflin.     $5.00. 

[60] 


sea-power  are  false,  that  in  actual  fact  the  main  items  of  expense  in  the 
United  States  navy  are  no  heavier  than  in  England  and  in  some  im- 
portant respects  much  lighter.  For  some  years  her  battleships  have  been 
built  at  a  lower  cost  than  England's.  The  gravity  of  the  limitation  of 
docks  on  the  Pacific  side  is  pointed  out.  Until  the  improvements  at 
Bemerton  are  completed — and  Congress  has  not  yet  made  appropriations 
for  that,  the  author  reminds  us — the  new  Pacific  fleet  cannot  be  kept  in 
good  condition  and  repair  even  in  peace,  much  less  in  war.  From  a 
strictly  practical  point  of  view  the  United  States  would  be  increasing 
the  efficiency  of  the  navy  to  a  far  greater  degree  by  spending  several 
millions  on  dockyards  improvements  than  if  the  same  amount  were  spent 
on  new  ships. 

The  personnel  of  the  United  States  navy  underwent  a  great  expansion 
during  the  late  war.  On  April  i,  1917,  the  estabHshment  numbered 
4,376  officers  and  62,667  men;  by  November  i,  1918,  it  had  increased  to 
10,400  officers  and  220,000  men.  Within  the  same  period  the  naval 
reserve  forces,  practically  non-existent  in  April,  1917,  reached  20,000 
officers  and  285,000  men.  But  immediately  after  the  Armistice  rapid 
demobiHzation  set  in.  Twelve  months  later  the  reserve  had  disappeared 
and  the  regular  establishment  had  been  reduced  to  160,000  officers  and 
men,  insufficient  to  provide  complements  for  the  ships  in  commission. 
And  though  as  a  result  of  the  efiforts  to  remedy  this  crisis  there  was  a 
marked  improvement  in  naval  recruiting,  at  the  beginning  of  1921  the 
personnel  was  still  20,000  or  30,000  below  the  authorized  total  and  both 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  fleets  were  short-handed. 

The  strength  of  the  United  States  navy  in  January  1921  including  all 
completed  ships  on  the  official  register  is  as  follows:  Dreadnought  battle- 
ships, 19;  Pre-Dreadnought  battleships,  18;  Armored  cruisers,  8;  Moni- 
tors, 6;  Cruisers,  first  class,  4;  Cruisers,  second  class,  4;  Destroyers, 
300;  Submarines,  115;  Gunboats,  32;  Patrol  vessels,  60;  Submarine 
chasers,  50  (about);  Tugs  and  minesweepers,  100;  Fuel  ships,  35; 
Special  auxiliaries,  51. 

Vessels  under  construction  to  be  completed  before  the  end  of  1923, 
Dreadnought  battleships,  10;  Battle  cruisers,  6;  Scout  cruisers,  10;  De- 
stroyers, 17;  Submarines,  39. 

The  list  shows  the  United  States  strong  in  heavy  armored  ships  and 
weak  in  fast  cruising  ships.  It  has  a  large  but  not  excessive  complements 
of  destroyers,  a  limited  number  of  ocean-going  submarines,  and  a  reserve 
of  auxiliary  vessels  adequate  for  home  waters  but  wholly  inadequate  to 
supply  a  fleet  operating  at  a  great  distance  from  its  base.  It  would  ap- 
pear, then,  that  American  naval  policy  hitherto  has  been  aimed  mainly  at 
Atlantic  and  Caribbean  strategy,  and  that  little  attempt  lias  been  made  to 

[61] 


forestall  a  war  in  the  Pacific,  where  the  conditions  are  radically  different. 

Four  chapters  are  given  to  the  Japanese  navy,  its  inception,  growth 
and  purpose,  administration,  dockyards,  shipbuilding  resources,  men  and 
ships,  torpedo  craft  and  air  service.  The  Japanese  naval  administration 
was  formerly  modelled  on  the  British  system;  but  in  recent  years  has 
been  completely  reorganized  to  resemible  the  German  system  before  the 
war.  Since  the  war  the  Japanese  navy  seems  to  have  become  the  senior 
service,  above  the  army.  Naval  officers  have  in  late  years  gained  a  de- 
cided hand  in  national  councils  and  policies,  a  fact  not  to  be  forgotten  in 
considering  the  possibilities  of  Japanese  naval  expansion.  The  policy  of 
Japan  may  be  regarded  ultimately  not  as  defensive  so  much  as  offensive, 
since  even  the  Japanese  Year  Book  admits  that  "the  object  of  expanding 
national  armaments  is  primarily  to  guard  our  interests  in  Manchuria 
and  China."  Japan's  ability  to  support  herself  with  respect  to  steel 
seems  not  so  certain  as  official  reports  would  seem  to  indicate,  but  pro-/ 
spects  seem  good  for  sufficient  production.  t 

Japanese  ship-'b'uilding  resources  have  grown  prodigiously  in  the  past 
few  years,  though  the  zenith  of  development  has  not  been  reached. 
They  may  be  summarized  as  follows :  Dockyards  capable  of  building 
hulls,  machinery  and  equipment  for  every  type  of  warship,  including 
dreadnoughts  and  battle  criusers,  4;  dockyards  of  the  same  capacity  up 
to  and  including  criusers,  4  (or  5)  ;  dockyards  capable  of  building 
destroyers,  submarines,  minelayers  and  smaller  craft,  10.  This  was  up 
to  1920,  but  it  is  believed  that  in  two  or  three  years  the  position  may  be 
more  than  doubled.  Since  most  of  the  technical  difficulties  have  been 
overcome,  Japanese  naval  expansion  will  in  future  b'e  limited  only  by 
the  amount  of  money  available.  In  design,  technical  knowledge  and  con- 
struction, despite  European  suppositions  to  the  contrary,  Japanese  ship- 
building can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  behind  that  of  Europe;  as  may  be 
said  to  be  the  case  with  regard  to  heavy  guns,  naval  explosives,  mines 
and  submarines,  which  latter  have  been  developed  to  meet  special  con- 
ditions in  western  Pacific  waters. 

At  the  close  of  the  Great  War  the  Japanese  Naval  Reserve  numbered 
38,000  officers  and  men,  and  by  1920  the  total  had  risen  above  41,000. 
The  intention  is  to  increase  the  reserve  to  43,000  by  1922  and  45,000 
by  1924.  That  will  make  a  total  of  127,000  officers  and  men,  active  and 
reservists.  The  strength  and  composition  of  the  Japanese  navy  at  the 
beginning  of  1921  are  as  follows:  Dreadnought  battleships,  completed, 
6,  building  and  authorized,  7 ;  Battle  cruisers,  completed,  4,  building  and 
authorized,  8;  pre-Dreadnaught  battleships,  completed,  8;  Armored 
cruisers,  completed,  12;  2nd  class  cruisers,  completed,  17,  building  and 
authorized,  16;  Coast  defence  ships,  ist  class,  completed,  3;  Coast  de- 

[62] 


fence  ships,  2nd  class,  completed,  12;  Gunboats,  completed,  8,  building 
lj,,and  authorized,  5;  Destroyers,  ist  class,  completed,  14,  building  and 
I  authorized,  25 ;  Destroyers,  2nd  class,  completed,  36,  building  and  author- 
ized, 20;  Destroyers,  3rd  class,  completed,  42;  Torpedo  boats,  ist  class, 
Icompleted,  12;  Torpedo  boatis,  2nd  class,  completed,  8;  Submarines, 
j completed,  42,  building  and  authorized,  65  (or  76). 

Japan  has  put  special  stress  on  torpedo  building,  and  with  the  com- 
pletion of  all  the  vessels  building  or  authorized  to  b'e  built  the  Japanese 
torpedo   flotilla   will   consist  of   thirty-seven   first-class   destroyers,   and 
sixty-nine  second-class  destroyers.    In  organization  and  training  methods 
I  the  Japanese  destroyer  service  is  closely  modelled  on  the  German,  the 
efficiency  of  which  is  admitted.    Japanese  seamen  seem  much  less  affected 
by  the  hardships  of  submarine  service,  and  it  is  calculated  that,  with  all 
conditions  identically  equal,  a  submarine  manned  by  Japanese  could  re- 
i-main  at  sea  thirty  percent  longer  than  one  manned  by  Westerners.    The 
frture  submarine  policy  of  Japan  includes  two  distinct  types,  first,  very 
I  large  ocean-going  cruisers  of  good  speed,  armed  with  two  or  more  heavy 
|quick  firing  guns  and  at  least  six  torpedo  tubes ;    second,  smaller  ocean- 
r going  vessels — averaging   1,000  tons  displacement — of  moderate   speed, 
with  two  medium  quick-firing  guns  and  four  or  more  torpedo  tubes. 
The    Navy    Flying   Corps    in    December,    1920,   included    270   officer 
pilots    and     160    officers    under    training.       Moreover    civilian    flying 
t  is  advancing  rapidly;    there  are   already   ten   aerodromes   operated  by 
|. private  companies;   and  the  three  Aviation  Societies — distinct  from  army 
J  and  navy  associations — have  a  membership  of   14,000.     It  would  seem 
^1.  probable  therefore  that  at  no  distant  date  Japan  will  be  one  of  the  leading 
;;.  air  powers  of  the  world.  What  is  more,  the  Japanese  possess  the  advan- 
l  tage  of  experience  with  their  peculiar  atmosphere,  where  sudden  variations 
i^end  typhoons  make  flying  possible  only  for  the  most  practiced  airmen. 
Mr.  Hector  C.  By  water's  chapter  on  strategy  in  the  Pacific  considers 
il  first  the  division  that  has  been  made  of  the  United  States  navy  into  two 
j,fleets  that  can  be  joined  together  without  reorganization.     Second,  the 
[relation  of  the  Panama  Canal  to  American  naval  strategy,  which  pivots 
1 01  it;  the  defence  of  the  canal,  by  sea  batteries  at  each  terminus,  field 
'works  in  the  vicinity  of  the  locks  with  a  minimum  of  7,000  men,  and 
submarine  flotillas  at  each  terminus.    War  with  Japan  in  the  immediate 
future,  he  believes,  would  confront  the  American  naval  command  with 
a  task  of  extraordinary  complexity.     On  the  one  hand  a  defensive  war, 
with  a  loss  of  the  possessions  in  the  Pacific,  a  confession  of  defeat; 
on  the  other  hand  fighting   under   conditions   so  difficult  that  victory 
vould  be  impossible.    The  capture  of  the  Philippines  as  conditions  stand 
at  present  would  be  easy   for  Japan.     He  discusses  the    fortifications 

[63] 


now  at  Hawaii;  the  defence  of  Guam,  now  neglected,  which  he  regards, 
with  pages  of  statistical  and  authoritative  support,  as  the  most  important 
item  in  the  whole  problem  of  the  western  Pacific.  In  contrast  to  these 
immense  handicaps  for  the  United  States,  the  strategic  position  of  Japan 
has  a  unique  advantage.  vShe  is  virtually  impregnable  to  attack  from  the 
United  Sates.  She  may  reckon  on  an  easy  capture  of  the  Philippines. 
She  has  the  former  German  insular  possession  near  to  Guam.  She  has 
a  multitude  of  haribors,  so  that  blockade  would  be  improbable.  The 
United  States  has  no  foothold  in  China  to  serve  as  a  base.  The  whole 
of  Honshu,  the  largest  island  of  Japan,  is  practically  served  by  the  rail- 
way, which  has  even  mounted  guns  on  heavy  trucks.  Japan's  reduction 
by  the  United  States  is  regarded  by  the  author  as  an  improbability. 

Political  and  economic  factors  conclude  the  book.  In  the  first  place 
it  is  pointed  out  that  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  would  not  hold,  a  fact 
coolly  admitted  by  many  of  the  Japanese  and  by  their  press,  who  are 
in  favor  of  abandoning  the  alliance  altogether  as  something  farcical 
and  without  fruits.  It  would  be  necessary,  as  Japanese  publicists  have 
admitted,  that  Japan  face  alone  the  Pacific  problem ;  she  is  not  likely 
to  have  any  hope  of  Chinese  support,  for  China  would  be  more  apt  to 
turn  against  Japan.  The  disparity  between  the  economic  resources  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States  is  poined  out  as  enormous,  and  the  cor- 
responding disparity  in  the  length  of  time  that  each  country  might  hold 
out  in  a  war  is  considered.  There  is  also  to  be  considered  the  relative 
poverty  of  Japan  and  her  overtaxed  people ;  the  danger  that  has  ensued 
from'  the  moving  of  the  people  from  the  farms  into  the  industrial  towns 
and  the  corresponding  decline  in  Japan's  ability  to  feed  herself,  which 
she  at  present  is  unable  to  do  without  imports.  But  in  spite  of  these 
and  other  dangers  it  is  evident  that  a  large  section  of  the  Japanese, 
people,  the  military  caste,  the  intellectuals  and  the  men  of  business  ar 
enthusiastic  supporters  of  armament  and  expansion,  to  which  state  o 
mind  the  press,  with  what  seems  to  be  government  indulgence  at  least 
loudly  contributes. 

To  foreign  observers  it  would  seem  that  Japan  has  everything  to  lose,  i 
and  nothing  to  gain.     She  has  already  Formosa  and  Korea  to  solve  her 
problem  of  over-population.     She  has  in  China  plenty  of  room  for  he 
legitimate  interests.     It  remains,  then,  to  be  seen,  in  the  opinion  of  M'- 
Bywater,  whether  her  rulers  and  statesmen  have  sufficient  acumen  t 
seize  the  unique  opportunity  thus  presented  to  them  instead  of  hazardin,:, 
the  fortunes  of  Japan  in  a  militarist  gamble  more  reckless  even  thaU' 
that  which  caused  the  ruin  of  the  German  Empire. 


[64] 


14    T 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

Tel.  No.  642-3405 
Renewals  may  be  made  4  days  I>riod  to  date  due. 
Renewed  books  are  subjea  to  immediate  recaU. 


.  a\zr^  2  3 


-ftETyWAiOJQ- 


.^m-v&i2^ 


R^^dM-J^^^--^^^^^^^^^-^ 


"larcisr   ^^*  ■  ^'^^ 


UUN    4l982lil. 

1V1AY211987 

liyiofliscMAY     b  I^Sr 


General  Library     . 
LD21A-60m-8,'70  University  of  Califonua         ^«f-,,-. 

(N88378l0)476— A-32  Berkeley  1932 


ffl|^^'^>f  vi:v^^;*^r^v;,  ■ 


^ 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


B0Q3D2dt>32 


y 


478419 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  LIBRARY 


Illiill'ii 


nliiiHI" 


!   iiil 


<iii!ill!< 


■ 


liillll!  i*':'l!': 


li  I  I!   <  Miliilill  II I 


I'll" 


i(ii|i''  i     '!' 


II  ilH' 


I  III'  i,l|ii'!i'iil 


ii;    Hvh"^ 


'iiii 


the 


ot*t' 


U 


aet<^^ 


to 


>"'  L^d,^  ,mo^ 


0 


^ 


{ 


P<'..nd  of  ^ 


the 


d 


hi«& 


or 


ev 


la^o 


.Tdis*^' 


Cof 


ytftCS 

C 


Cortf^'  '     but '"  V  of  l''»^'^     ■    -  ''"^'^     -    ^'^ 


as.'""""!.!.!..     -• 


^ 


Trttf7 


thU  r-,tHe 


